Nuclear Iran

The recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran said that the Islamic Republic has taken steps to acquire dual use (civilian and military) nuclear technology as well as testing some of the base components of nuclear weapons. Much of the recent discourse has centered around an Israeli strike on Iran's key facilities. While this strategy has worked for Israel in the past, bombing will not take the Iranian nuclear program offline. At best, a military strike will delay weaponization by a few years, but the long-term effect of an attack would be counter-productive by underscoring the Iranian need for the ultimate deterrent. A diplomatic solution is the best bet for preventing a nuclear armed Iran from creating a Middle East Cold War.

The first question that should be asked is whether it matters if Iran develops a nuclear arsenal. After the Iranian revolution ousted the American-installed Shah in 1979, Iran has an extensive history of kidnapping Americans in addition to assisting in the 1983 bombing of American Marine barracks in Beirut. Iran's open patronage of militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas as means of furthering their influence in the region increases the frightening possibility of a nuclear device being used against a regional rival. From Iran's perspective, the incentive to acquire a deterrent that would insure against invasion is abundantly clear based on its recent history. Iran was involved in a brutal eight-year war that involved chemical weapons after it was invaded by Iraq. After 9/11, the United States invades Afghanistan which shares Iran's eastern border. Later, George W. Bush groups Iran with Iraq before invading the latter. Worrisome hypothetical situations easily come to mind when considering the introduction of a nuclear weapon, but mutually assured destruction is not a given. The Cold War never erupted into an open war and the network of aligned countries for indirect conflict is already established, but without the ideological foundation. Those opposed to a nuclear Iran in addition to the U.S. would be Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Britain, and France. Iran's coalition is a mix between nations vociferously supporting the Islamic Republic's right to nuclear power (Venezuela, Brazil, etc), Russia and China whom support and protect it in the United Nations Security Council, and non-state organizations in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain. In this scenario the real danger is similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis in which tensions run high, communication is almost nil, and erroneous assumptions could lead to a nuclear exchange.

Israel's foreign policy toward hostile neighbors has consistently relied on preemptive strikes, establishing deterrence by disproportionately reacting to attacks, and refusing to comment on its military capacity or action in other countries. Israel has bombed a reactor in both Iraq and Syria and succeeded in meeting their short term goals. There was no retaliation and only verbal condemnation by the international community. Geographically, Israel is a tiny country and its cities are some of the most densely populated in the world. If it were to suffer a nuclear attack, retaliation might not even be an option. A study organized by the FBI found that the forensic evidence left behind by a nuclear detonation could take months to trace back to its origin.



Bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would be exponentially more difficult than previous operations. In both previous cases, Israel's objective was to destroy a single reactor. Iran has 15 nuclear facilities, they are are near population centers, and the Fordow reactor (capable of producing weapons grade material) is buried deep within a mountain. Not only is Fordow impossible to attack with conventional bombing, but it is near Qom, the epicenter of scholarship for the dominant denomination of Islam in Iran, Shiism. Given that the various sites are spread across a large area and situated among population centers there would likely be a high number of casualties for both sides. The 2009 protests after the Iranian regime's vote rigging and subsequent infighting between President Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei would be forgotten as the regime could solidify its control as nationalistic fervor would come to a boil. The isolative diplomatic position of the Islamic Republic would harden and the value of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against regime change would grow. Any civilian casualties would affirm the wildest suspicions of every conspiracy theorist that paints the U.S. and Israel with the same villainous broad brush.

The role for the U.S. in this situation is unclear. On one hand the U.S. has put an incredible amount of political, military, and financial support behind the only functioning democracy in the Middle East. But the allegiance cuts both ways and the potential for the U.S. to be dragged into a potential conflict is quite high. When Israel bombed the Syrian reactor in 2007, the initial reactions from American officials indicated that the U.S. was not aware of the attack until it hit the news. Given the unfavorable image the U.S. has in the Middle East, the best option would be for the U.S. to do what it can to restrain Israel and organize international pressure on Russia and China. China is Iran's largest trading partner and it has been susceptible to international pressure in the past, but those moments were in the run up to the 2008 Olympics. Sanctions have been effective in stifling Iran's economic growth.

With so much of Iran's economy controlled by the country's religious leaders and Revolutionary Guard, sanctions have solidified the regime's grip on the economy. 60% of Iran's economy is composed of oil revenues which is not quite enough to allow the government to finance programs without care like some of its gulf neighbors. While it is the fourth largest oil producer in the world, the Islamic Republic lacks sufficient facilities to refine oil into gasoline, so it exports oil and imports gasoline and depresses the price of gas with enormous subsidies. The Iranian government also subsidizes bread and several other household staples which eat a large part of the national budget. Attempts to cut subsidies have been wildly unpopular and have hamstrung economic reforms. Sanctions will be effective if they increase resentment towards the regime and trap it in a lose-lose situation in which it cannot cut subsidies and cannot take steps to improve the economy.

Any American action that would impede Iran's ability to supply oil would cause the price of gasoline, heating, shipping, produce, etc. to rise and make a bad economic situation in the U.S. worse. The political backlash from American constituents would severely decrease American policy makers' appetite for further action against Iran. It's true that the U.S. does not import oil from Iran, but oil is sold on an international market and any dip in Iranian exports will mean that China, Japan, India, Italy, and South Korea will have to look elsewhere and prices will soar. For sanctions to be effective, Iran's other trade partners would need to be willing to cooperate. In sum, the United States can effectively disrupt Iran's aspirations of developing nuclear weapons with diplomacy and sanctions. Iran has struggled to complete a project that other countries have accomplished in considerably less time (China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea). It would not be too much of a leap to infer that sanctions have greatly hampered Iran's progress. Pressuring Russia and China does not often result in cooperation with American interests, but the U.S. has strong ties with most of Iran's biggest trade partners, the aforementioned Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Italy. Attacking Iran would temporarily set back a weapons program and make any future interactions unlikely to yield results.

There is no Military Solution for Syria

The violent repression of pro-democracy protesters in Syria presents a difficult challenge for President Obama and his policy makers that is unlike any other in the Arab Spring. Since Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on March 28th that there will be no military intervention in Syria on March 28th, the severity of the government crackdown against protesters has escalated significantly. The Syrian intelligence services, or mukhabarat, is reported to have shot soldiers who refused to fire on protesters, snipers have been clearing the streets, a journalist was sent to an Iranian detention center, civilians fleeing into Lebanon have been turned over to the Syrian military, corpses showing signs of torture have been left in public squares, a mass grave outside Daraa has been uncovered, and tanks have shelled cities.

Some criticize Obama for inconsistent standards for intervention, considering his decision to step in during the backlash against protesters in Libya. The truth is that the issues in Syria are very different and an intervention by the U.S. military would not lead to a quick and decisive result.

Syria is a country of 22 million people in an area similar in size to North Dakota. The Assad family has been in control of the government, military, and economy since Hafez al-Assad appointed himself president in 1970. Hafez, the current president's father, ousted President Nureddin al-Atassi and Ba'ath Party Secretary General Salah Jadid that he had recently helped install in 1963. After decades of tumultuous leadership, Hafez al-Assad consolidated power by stocking the military and ubiquitous secret police with family and members of his Alawite religious sect, a group which accounts for 10% of the population. With the security services as the backbone of his regime, the final piece of the puzzle was establishing a patronage system for wealthy Sunnis. This created a system were business interests were dependent on Hafez's favoritism. Aside from his cult of personality portraying him as an omniscient, infallible father figure, his indelible legacy is razing the city of Hama (See Hama Rules for more). Hafez's oldest son Basil had been groomed to succeed  as president until Basil died in a car crash in the early 90's. After Basil's death, Hafez recalled his middle son Bashar from London where he had been studying to be an eye doctor. When Bashar took over the presidency after his father died in 2000 he was widely touted as a reformer. His inaugural speech made a point of emphasizing reform language. As recently as the end of March, American officials were still referring to him as a reformer. It is fairly simple to trace the arc of his father's career to the current regime. Before Hafez took over as president, the regime ruling Syria was divided in two camps, those focused on social reform and those who sought safety with the iron fist of the military. When Bashar took over, he maintained the system his father had established by promoting siblings and cousins to positions of prestige in the military and business world. Bashar has taken steps to liberalize the economy, opening the Damascus Stock Exchange, permitting private banks, lowering interest rates, and cutting subsidies. While the economy has grown, the benefits are enjoyed most by those with connections to the ruling family. Bashar al-Assad's rule has been mainly focused on prolonging his own presidency.

When considering America's experiences in Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq and the Balkans, it is clear that the general rule of American humanitarian expedition is that the potential for American casualties needs to be low, there needs to be a clear definition of obligations, and most importantly, any kind of action must lead to stability in some way. Intervention in Libya will be the exception. The U.S.'s military might is not going to be an effective tool in supporting democratic movements in the Arab Spring. The recent protests have hinged on the domestic military's willingness to kill civilians on behalf of the ruling elite:

• The Tunisian revolution was allowed to run its own course as the military refused to shoot at protesters and the president fled. 
• The U.S. role in Egypt's revolution is more difficult to discern. Hosni Mubarak was cooperative with U.S. goals and the U.S. was willing to turn a blind eye to his dictatorship. When protests started, the administration dithered on outright support of the Tahrir Square protesters. 
• In Yemen, the Obama administration has not applied pressure on its erstwhile partner in the War on Terror, President Saleh, to allow democratic reforms. This probably has more to do with the fact that Yemen is a nightmare waiting to happen. The country has gone through two civil wars, the last one in 1994. The national government's control is non-existent outside the capital, there is a strong secessionist movement in the south, and tribal warlords. Yemen is widely regarded as the most heavily armed population in the world, its water supply is dwindling, and khat use is rampant. Oil reserves make up 75% of government revenues, account for 90% of exports, and will dry up within a decade. It has the same population of its neighbor Saudi Arabia and 25% of the land mass. The average age is 18. Yemen is also host to the most active Al-Qaeda franchise. These are all elements that do not bode well for the future.
• In Bahrain, home of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, Obama stopped at simply urging restraint in the vicious crackdown of protesters. 
• In the case of Syria, the U.S. just passed tougher sanctions targeting president Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle, the European Union agreed on similar sanctions. These are largely symbolic, sanctions are an artifact from a bygone era that now serve to hinder, but by no means will they uproot regimes. With Syrian - U.S. relations on the rocks for years, there are probably few economic relations that sanctions would actually affect. 

Gaddafi's regime is an easy target. The man is an international pariah, and it was clear that no one would lift a finger to help him if the U.S. and NATO dropped the hammer on him. Once a prominent Pan-Arabist he is widely hated amongst Arab League states, he asks European governments to humiliate themselves before allowing access to Libyan oil, he ordered the Lockerbie Bombing, and he is still blamed for disappearing the Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr. He has restyled himself as a Pan-Africanist and a few years ago he was anointed the "King of Kings" by a collection of African tribal kings. When the Libyan civil war started a delegation of heads of state and foreign ministers fronted by South African premier Jacob Zuma attempted to broker a peace deal that essentially said that the rebels would give up their arms and Gaddafi would think about maybe making some reforms. Gaddafi soured his inter-African relationships by treating his peers as junior partners.

Syria is a horse of a different color. The regime is a favorite client of Iran, receiving training, supplies, and weapons. The two countries also share a defense pact. While Syria's military may not be on par with that of the U.S., they have been very active in stifling American objectives in the region in a variety of ways: 

• actively supporting Hamas and Hezbollah attacks on Israel.
• funneling militants into Iraq to fight the American occupation.
• building a secret nuclear reactor in a rogue act that unsettled its neighbors in a region in which secretive nuclear facilities are a sensitive issue i.e. Israel's unacknowledged nuclear weapons, Iraq's alleged attempts to build a nuclear bomb, tensions regarding Iran's efforts to establish themselves as a nuclear force.
• controling the Lebanese government through bribes and extortion.

National Public Radio featured a story about inevitable change in Syria, but with the level of brutality used to quash protests, the Syrian rebellion seems more likely to follow the trajectory of Iran 2009, when protesters were murdered and tortured, and ultimately the movement was successfully suppressed. The root causes of the rebellion will be left to simmer. John McCain rightly said that Syrian protesters should not expect a military intervention. Although disheartening, it is better to be up front about what support the U.S. can offer rather than tepidly offer support and then hang rebels out to dry like Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War in 1991. There will not be a military solution to Syria, but what the U.S. could do is use its influence in the World Trade Organization to accept Syria, which has applied twice and been rejected both times. In exchange, President Assad would have to step down and agree to disassemble the familial controls over the government, economy, and security forces. This is highly unlikely considering that Syria relies heavily on the patronage of Iran and the acquiescence of Russia on the UN Security Council.

Most Syrians have only known the chaos of the pre-Assad rule and the tyrannous reign that has been going on in the 40 years since, and any proposed transition will be raise the specter of violence seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and recent attacks on women and religious minorities in Egypt. After 40 years of brutalizing political dissidents and snuffing out Islamists, there are plenty whose yearning for justice will not be satisfied by having Assad sidelined and may seek retribution.

Syria presents a tempting prize for intervention advocates. Syria is vital to myriad nations' security, energy, democratic, and economic plans. For interventionists, the ideal outcome would be unplugging Syria as Iran's link to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah. Also, the secret peace talks with Israel brokered by Turkey would be cemented after being broken off because of the 2009 Israeli conflict with Hamas. Thirdly, the long border with Iraq would remain quiet (Assad had quietly shut down the border to militants years ago). Syria produces modest quantities of oil and natural gas, but its location makes it a key hub for pipeline networks. Also, the economy is largely underdeveloped, but it had been making baby steps in becoming slightly more cosmopolitan. But none of this will be possible through violence. Forcibly removing the ruthless dictator and his inner circle would leave a greater void than was left in Iraq. There needs to be an orderly transition of power and that would require Assad to voluntarily hand over the reins. Unfortunately, if a country with strong diplomatic, economic, and security ties to Syria, like Turkey, cannot persuade the Assad regime to curb the violence, then the U.S. has few effective options and will be relegated to waiting in the wings.

Book Review: The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes You a Happy Birthday

Having just finished Neil MacFarquhar’s excellent book, The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes You a Happy Birthday, I am impressed at the true breadth and depth of his experience in the Middle East and North Africa. The book is an absolute must read for anyone intrigued by the recent unrest in the Arab world.

MacFarquhar worked as a journalist in the region for the better part of 30 years. The bookopens with his upbringing in Libya on whatamounted to an Texas oil company colony. From this vantage point, he relates funny anecdotes and explores cultural phenomena that are widely misunderstood in the United States. He covers a range of topics: the impact of satellite TV, the intrusiveness of secret police, fatwas, jihad, tribal relations, and the capacity and tolerance for reform in several countries. MacFarquhar illuminates causes of Arab ill will towards the U.S. and areas where the people of the region agree with American policy. The latter part of the book examines the potential for U.S. policy goals (i.e. American national security, democracy, human rights, security for Israel, etc.) and how the U.S. government could better cooperate with their Arab counterparts. He has three big policy shifts that would require a great deal of bravery for a politician of any stripe, as well as an earnest effort to recognize differences in political currents within the meaningfully diverse nations in the Middle East and North Africa.

1. Speak to the citizenry about their concerns on their level. For example, we should not dictate that education curriculums have to change despite that the status quo has served to create foot soldiers for Al Qaeda. U.S. policy makers should listen to parents’ concerns about the schools’ inadequacies and ask questions that highlight mutual concerns without dictating specific curricular changes. This explicit common ground will apply indirect pressure on regimes. MacFarquhar says that the U.S. focuses too much on short-term goals. The U.S. is willing to turn a blind eye to kabuki democracies in exchange for cooperation on energy issues or the war on terror. MacFarquhar points out that criticizing the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia would have likely led to the loss of an ally. He adds that an open society could oppose Washington because its policies might go against the grain of popular opinion.
2. Vocally support change regardless of how its weak proponents are or if the goals mirror U.S. interests. He suggests that the U.S. should only throw its support behind reform advocates that have stellar reputations in their home countries and try to avoid individuals attempting to capitalize on U.S. support by echoing key policy vernacular. He adds that it would probably be better to strengthen civic institutions rather than push for elections. In many countries, the political parties are anemic at best, with the most active opposition parties being the Islamist parties. He says that this could be problematic for U.S. policy makers as a group similar to Hamas could ultimately win elections and, likewise, create an impasse. (insert note about political participation & concentrated interest). He adds that, “Washington should not lose any opportunity to be seen as a friend of the little guy, and not just a friend of the princes.” (p.356)
3. The U.S. should condemn all repression, especially the near-constant harassment that most people suffer at the hands of the secret police. The U.S. was very vocal about tyranny in the Soviet bloc and most Middle East secret police were mentored by Soviet agencies. “Real stability and security should be rooted in stronger political systems.” MacFarquhar argues that most Arabs do not want to trade in despotic secular regimes for despotic theocratic regimes. The author states that what people want is less corruption and better government services, and they think that religious parties are the only ones strong enough to deliver. He argues that U.S. foreign policy should return to "doing the right thing," and that this would go a long way to fix the U.S.'s image problem. He argues that real security will be the product of focusing foreign policy on a broad, reasonable bulk of Middle Eastern citizens rather than compromising American values for the assured results of a dictator.