A Standoff

Before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon finalized its initial indictments for the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, Hezbollah demanded that Rafik's son and current prime minister, Saad Hariri, disavow the tribunal. Leaks had indicated that the tribunal was going to drop the hammer on several Hezbollah members. Saad Hariri refused to comply, and Hezbollah's political coalition withdrew their ministers from the cabinet, effectively shutting down the government. Turkish - Qatari efforts at mediation failed, as did the previous Saudi - Syrian attempt. As the situation stands, tensions are mounting as an office of the Christian political party affiliated with Hezbollah was recently targeted for a grenade attack. Hezbollah deployed bands of unarmed men around Beirut. Although they did not appear to do anything besides loitering and chatting on walkie-talkies, it was enough to cause schools to shut down. Hariri made a defiant speech declaring that justice for his family and Lebanon will not be sold out because of the opposition's threats of violence.

As it now stands, there is one man who can tip the balance: Walid Jumblatt. His Druze voting bloc can give either coalition a majority and the right to appoint the new prime minister. After the 2008 skirmishes between Hezbollah and Jumblatt's fighters, Jumblatt threw his support behind the Hezbollah - Syria coalition. But now, Jumblatt seems to be at a crossroads. Syria assassinated his father decades ago. After a car bomb killed Rafik Hariri along with 22 others, Jumblatt was one of the most visible critics of Syria. Recently, he said that there could be "catastrophic consequences" if he sides with Hariri. As the head of a small community in proximity to a superior military force, he has a responsibility for the safety of his people, but at a potentially steep political cost. Jumblatt has said publicly that he will support the Hezbollah-Syrian candidate for prime minister, but he said he could only convince four or five of his bloc's 11 MPs to side with the opposition. Is this a clever maneuver to passive-aggressively cow to Hezbollah and Syria's requests while keeping his personal preference for prime minister in place? Or is Jumblatt's bloc, The Democratic Gathering, really so divided that individual MPs would defy the head of the party and stick their necks out? Or is Jumblatt splitting his MPs so that neither side has a majority and the new prime minister must be negotiated?

We will find out on Monday when the parliament meets with the president to decide who will be prime minister. In the meantime, the Lebanese army is establishing checkpoints and taking defensive positions around government buildings. Grocery stores and pharmacies are seeing people rush to stockpile essentials. Hopefully all this preparation will have been for nought.

Hezbollah, a Primer

Hezbollah has a role in Lebanese politics that is difficult to compare to any other organization in the world. They are at once a political party, hospital administrators, a micro-loan lender, a cable news network, and (at least in the eyes of the West) a terrorist organization. Hezbollah's permanence is fortified by the thousands that depend on them for social services, and by their function as the country's sole military power. The Party of God (Hezbollah's name translated to English) derives a great deal of their popularity from the fact that they are the sole armed group, including the Lebanese army, capable of standing up to Israel's military. "Resistance" has become synonymous with Hezbollah in Lebanese politics, and the party has always fought disarmament of its militia, even going as far as getting the cabinet to declare the militia's role as essential to national security. Hezbollah operates within the legitimate political structure until frustration sets in and they then utilize violence against their countrymen to get what they want.

Hezbollah's main pillars of support are Lebanon's Shia population and the Iranian government. Shia account for roughly a third of Lebanon's population and have historically been grossly under-served by the government. Around 2005, the typical Shi'ite made one fifth of the national average income. Thanks to Iran's significant financial contribution (estimated at $100 million yearly), Hezbollah is able to play Robin Hood and fill the void left by a negligent government. The party's popularity received major boosts in 2000, when Hezbollah attacks precipitated Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and in 2006, when Hezbollah fought the Israeli military to a draw. Israel is perceived by most Lebanese as the country's main enemy regardless of sect. During the 2006 war, opinion polls showed strong support for Hezbollah's militant fighting from Christians, Druze, and Sunnis. Although Hezbollah's secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, conceded that provoking Israel was a mistake, resisting the Israeli military's attempt to land a knockout blow bolstered their claim to be the people's champion throughout the wider Middle East. It also galvanized their claims for both the necessity and the strength of their arms.

Lebanon has a confessional political structure that is set up to give proportionate representation to all of the 18 recognized religious groups based on a census completed in 1932. While the confessional system was clearly imperfect at its inception in the 1940s, the growing Shia population soon out-stripped the governmental power allotted to them based on the 1932 census. Conducting a new census has very little traction because of the fears that it could reignite sectarian conflict. There is a perception that a new census would show that the Christian population has declined and the confessional system would have to be adjusted to decrease their representation. Part of the peace agreement that ended the civil war (1975-1990) was an alteration of the constitution to allow Christians and Muslims the same number of parliamentary seats (in contrast to the existing 6:5 ratio that favored Christians). Perhaps the biggest change has been the allowance for a parliamentary minority to have a veto. The veto was part of the 2008 Doha Accord, which ended gunfights in Beirut after the government shut down Hezbollah's private communications network and fired the head of airport security (a member of the party). Dahiyya, a southern suburb of Beirut, is a Hezbollah stronghold situated just north of the airport. When the head of airport security was fired, Hezbollah blockaded the roads leading to the airport. Another particularly unsettling part of the airport affair was the government's discovery of a Hezbollah surveillance camera system set up to monitor arrivals and departures. Ultimately, Hezbollah laid siege to buildings affiliated with the majority parties. At this time, there were also gunfights between Druze loyal to Walid Jumblatt and Hezbollah. After the fighting stopped, Jumblatt's parliamentary bloc switched its allegiance to the Hezbollah-Syria bloc that he had previously vociferously opposed. Perhaps most tellingly, last fall, Hezbollah indulged in a domestic military exercise simulating a coup d'état.

As it stands, Hezbollah has a veto allowing them to shut down the government at will, popular support, a military strength capable of standing up to Israel, the backing of Syria and Iran, and a tireless willingness to extort their countrymen.