Russia and China Hang the Syrian People Out to Dry

A resolution introduced to the United Nations Security Council that sought an unspecified military action in Syria failed to pass. The resolution was vetoed by Russia and China. Both countries have abysmal human rights records and frequently respond to dissent with violence, both are afraid of military intervention on humanitarian grounds becoming a slippery slope. Russia has been especially vocal about the intervention in Libya original, explicit purpose to protect civilians from Gaddafi's troops in Misrata transforming into regime change.

Around 3,000 people have died since the protests began in March and there does not seem to be any internal developments that will lead to a breakthrough. The opposition has organized a group to direct the political and military operations, similar to Libya's Transitional National Council. So far the Syrian opposition have little to show for their efforts with the exception of taking hold of Rastan, a fairly small city in the Homs region. Much of the Syrian National Council's success was attributed to soldiers defecting. In the beginning stages of the protests, reports surfaced of army and intelligence personnel breaking away, but these departures were not indicative of underlying schisms in the military that would eventually lead to significant fractures. The Syrian government seems to have cauterized their defection problem when videos emerged showing soldiers who refused to attack civilians were shot by intelligence officers.

The prospects of President Bashar al-Assad leaving office or serious reforms are looking dire. Structurally, the military and intelligence services continue to be the foundation of Assad's power, with the military under control of his brother and intelligence being directed by his brother-in-law. There will be no Egypt style military coup to usher out the long standing dictator. The United States and Europe have imposed sanctions, but Iran continues to support its client state which to negate international sanctions. Syria has been vital to Iran's foreign interests. Syria actively acts as both agitator and the hub for Iranian weapons, funds, and intelligence for Hamas and Hezbollah. While Iranian support for Shiite militant groups poured across the border into southern Iraq, Syria funneled combatants into the Sunni areas. Syria also has an extensive history of interfering in Lebanese affairs, as well as recently encouraging Palestinian protesters to cross the border into Israel. Some of the leadership of both Hezbollah and Hamas are hosted in Damascus.

Now that the UN Security Council is a dead end with its allies protecting them in the UN Security Council, it appears as if the Assad regime will simply have to wait out the protests. The media continues to draw comparisons between Libya and Syria, but the case of  a distant outlier. It is almost impossible to imagine that the Arab League will support intervention in Syria as it did in Libya. Recently, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev called for Assad to step down or reform, but Medvedev's comments should be regarded as criticism from a concerned individual and not an indication of Russian foreign policy. Similar comments from Vladimir Putin would signal a real change.

The Syrian opposition appears bereft of outside support. Unless they can quickly organize themselves into a coherent political block with an armed wing that can seize and hold towns against the onslaught of the Syrian military, Syria will return to the status quo, much as Iran did in 2009.

Arab Spring Scorecard

Tunisia: Ben Ali is exiled in Saudi Arabia with his haul of gold.

Egypt: Hosni Mubarak is currently on trial while also dealing with serious health issues. Until a few days ago, his trial was broadcast on live TV. The ailing former head of state was too ill to sit in a chair, so he laid on a bed inside a cage.

Yemen: President Saleh seems to be under an informal house arrest in Saudi Arabia after being hospitalized there following an attack. Saleh has been out of the hospital for some time and frequently promises to return to Yemen.

Iran: Protests earlier this year were quickly and brutally put down. There has been little in the way of demonstrations since.

Libya: Gaddafi has a million dollar bounty on his head. Rebels are tightening their grip on Tripoli as the opposition Transitional National Council tries to quell fears about its ability to rule and to rule justly.

Syria: Bashir al-Assad recently made promises of reforms and municipal elections while continuing his horrific crackdown on civilians and militants alike. This seems to be another phase in Assad's cycle of empty promises and mass murder.

Major Field Experiments, Yes. Can we get some basic data for where we're working too?

Chris Blattman recently posted an article entitled “One of the nicest field experiments I have ever seen” praising a study that showed positive impacts from a women-focused voter awareness campaign. He is so impressed with the impact evaluation study that he ends the article with a death note to the other form of studying development tools, “if the era of simple NGO program evaluation is not dead, it is gasping its dying breath.” http://chrisblattman.com/2011/07/21/one-of-the-nicest-field-experiments-i-have-seen/

I wholeheartedly agree that “simple program evaluation” is passé as a tool for adding to our knowledge about development tools. NGO program evaluations are useless for extrapolating findings.  They study a single situation after a program has been employed. Even for their own context, they can’t really show impact (change due to the program,) because they have no counter-example proving the change wouldn't have occurred in the absence of the program. Even if a program evaluation compares multiple programs, it is impossible to tell if the difference is due to the difference in what the programs did and not how the programs were run. Program evaluations essentially miss 95% of the reality happening even within their own parameters. If Blattman is right that this method is dead, I’m not sure who will be at the funeral. But to put "program evaluations" and impact evaluations side-by-side is like comparing apples and apple trees.

   

Randomized control experiments cost millions of dollars (mostly provided by philanthropic donors). The interventions studied must be organized entirely with the study in mind, from the beginning. They often need to include a pilot study and can take over two years to complete. These studies are cumbersome, but there is great pay off in terms of answering specific questions about human economic and social behavior. It would be great if more field practitioners got more contact with the resulting articles.

However, great as they are, today’s rare experimental studies still leave a huge gap in making international development interventions more successful.  Imagine you are in the field. Instead of just doing your job in the international industry and following the log-frame passed down to you, you decide, one day, to step back and reflect on what is really needed. You need data. But wait, there is no money to collect data about the five villages you want to work with, much less the other five villages you eventually want to compare your work with so you can see if it made a difference. The only way to get funding is to act, not to assess. Substantial pre-project data gathering is just unrealistic in the current development industry. So you give up and carry-on taking orders with a sneaking suspicion that the resources you are delivering, even with winks and nods to the findings of published experimental studies, aren’t really connecting with the beneficiaries.

It is time we start to think about how local, quality research can be funded in all project sites and potential project sites. Substantial and consistent pre-project data collection (beyond rare University studies and 12^th hour number pulling for project proposals) is as critical to the success of development efforts as learning the answers to questions like “are women more likely to vote if they are encouraged to do so?” Taking it one step further, communities themselves could actually get involved and excited by regular data gathering. If they could see data about themselves presented data back to them (in culturally appropriate formats), there could be all kinds of otherwise unexplainable positive impacts occurring across many different projects. But this requires support and funding. It is worth building some branches (regular local data collection) from the trees (randomized control studies) even if we just let the apples (program evaluation) rot.

President Saleh's First Appearance Since the Attack

I apologize for the long layoff between posts. I've been on the road for a while.

Watching Yemeni President Saleh's prerecorded video, I was struck by how drastically different he looks.
Before he was injured in an attack on the presidential compound, he was commonly seen in a suit or military uniform, tidy mustache, dyed hair. After, the wardrobe is significantly different, perhaps to reflect his temporary/new residency in Saudi Arabia, not to mention the white beard in lieu of the black mustache. Also, you can seen signs of his wounds in the skin on the end of his nose, lips, around the ear, and under the chin. He looks to have had some of his eyebrows burned off. CNN reported that he also had a collapsed lung. It remains to be seen if he will truly return to Yemen to continue a presidency that stretches back to 1978. He had previously floated the idea of stepping down in exchange for immunity, but outraged protesters conveyed the idea that immunity was not acceptable. In the video he vaguely mentions reforms, but he also refers to the attack as an "accident" and an "incident." This is not language that indicates he has really come to terms with the end of his reign.

Before

After

Top Reads

A Quiet Revolution, in Beirut - NYTimes.com
Lebanon has been outside of the wave of protests washing across the Middle East and North Africa. This is an interesting look at how life in Lebanon is dominated by which religious sect one belongs to. Laws regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc are all dependent on religion. A person can convert to a religion that has a more favorable inheritance law and switch back afterwards.  Lebanon's confessional system was originally set up to ensure equitable representation of the 16 religions. The architects of this system thought it would encourage cross-sectarian cooperation, but in reality it has further entrenched the identification with coreligionists instead of a national identity. Tony Dauod is advocating for a laws that emphasize nationality.

Tony Daoud in Lebanon with a sign that reads “Square of Change.” Photograph by Matthew Cassel for The New York Times

Blackwater Founder Builds Mideast Mercenary Army to Put Down Revolts | Danger Room | Wired.com
This is an older article, but it is a fascinating look at Erik Prince's efforts to build a private army of African and Latin American veterans to put down revolts in the Persian Gulf. Prince's comparison of Blackwater's relationship to the U.S. military and FedEx's to USPS is thought provoking to say the least, especially in light of the Navy Seal operation to kill Osama Bin Laden. Also, a foreign fighters that make up the domestic security force in Abu Dhabi would have fewer reservations about killing civilians that the mercenaries do not identify with.

Just in case you happen to hate your job today… – Chris Blattman


My Syria, Awake Again After 40 Years - NYTimes.com
The son of the Syrian president that preceded Hafez al-Assad comments on the regime's delusional belief that Syria can be quarantined from the rest of the world.

Legalizing Drugs Won't Stop Mexico's Brutal Cartels - By Elizabeth Dickinson | Foreign Policy
Elizabeth Dickinson explains that drug cartels in Mexico are expanding into other enterprises. I thought one of the more interesting ideas she mentions, but does not fully explore is that the global drug trade is a $320 billion industry, so perhaps the cartels are more desperate to hold on to their market share since the pie is getting smaller in their area.

Obama Can Stop the Killing in Syria - By Tony Badran | Foreign Policy
Tony Badran's suggestion that Syria could be brought to heel by the usual diplomatic actions that signal at the U.S.'s displeasure. Recalling ambassadors or ending diplomatic ties entirely will not work with a country that had scant relations with the U.S. to begin with. As long as Syria is supported financially by Iran and protected in the UN by a Russian veto.

Libya - Ten non-violent options | Carne Ross

What we can do to bring down dictators | Carne Ross | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

Carne Ross, of Independent Diplomat, presents diplomatic options to address the crisis in Libya. He presents a range of options that should be considered part of a wider range of tools, not an exclusive course of action.

Here's a Map of the Humanitarian Crisis Hotspots in Libya (Don't Tell Gaddafi) | Fast Company

iRevolution | From innovation to Revolution
A blog that explores best practices for protesters.

The Green Wave

Before the Arab Spring, there were the Tehran protests after the elections in 2009. Before Mohamed Bouazizi and Hamza Ali al-Khateeb, there was Neda Agha-Soltan. After battle wounds forced Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh to leave the country and pro-democracy protests ousted dictators in Tunisia and Egypt, casual observers can be forgiven for assuming that every uprising has a democratic trajectory. But the protests following a sham election in Iran had a different ending. The Iranian establishment crushed each new wave of protests with an astonishing brutality. In Egypt the police progressed from batons to tear gas and briefly to goons with pistols. Iranian security services' initial response was to shoot civilians indiscriminately.  Reformist tumult in Iran was eventually extinguished.

Earlier this year I saw an excellent documentary about the 2009 protests called The Green Wave. The film maker use of animation and video footage push the sense of panic and horror described in the the personal narratives of the protests. The movie also interviews with some prominent Iranian candidates, reform activists, and politicians. The Green Wave is an incredible look inside such an important country that is too often characterized by its bombastic leadership.

Here are some Q & A's with the director:

Q&A: The Green Wave | Sundance Film Festival

Documenting Iran's Green Wave | Human Rights Watch

There is no Military Solution for Syria

The violent repression of pro-democracy protesters in Syria presents a difficult challenge for President Obama and his policy makers that is unlike any other in the Arab Spring. Since Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on March 28th that there will be no military intervention in Syria on March 28th, the severity of the government crackdown against protesters has escalated significantly. The Syrian intelligence services, or mukhabarat, is reported to have shot soldiers who refused to fire on protesters, snipers have been clearing the streets, a journalist was sent to an Iranian detention center, civilians fleeing into Lebanon have been turned over to the Syrian military, corpses showing signs of torture have been left in public squares, a mass grave outside Daraa has been uncovered, and tanks have shelled cities.

Some criticize Obama for inconsistent standards for intervention, considering his decision to step in during the backlash against protesters in Libya. The truth is that the issues in Syria are very different and an intervention by the U.S. military would not lead to a quick and decisive result.

Syria is a country of 22 million people in an area similar in size to North Dakota. The Assad family has been in control of the government, military, and economy since Hafez al-Assad appointed himself president in 1970. Hafez, the current president's father, ousted President Nureddin al-Atassi and Ba'ath Party Secretary General Salah Jadid that he had recently helped install in 1963. After decades of tumultuous leadership, Hafez al-Assad consolidated power by stocking the military and ubiquitous secret police with family and members of his Alawite religious sect, a group which accounts for 10% of the population. With the security services as the backbone of his regime, the final piece of the puzzle was establishing a patronage system for wealthy Sunnis. This created a system were business interests were dependent on Hafez's favoritism. Aside from his cult of personality portraying him as an omniscient, infallible father figure, his indelible legacy is razing the city of Hama (See Hama Rules for more). Hafez's oldest son Basil had been groomed to succeed  as president until Basil died in a car crash in the early 90's. After Basil's death, Hafez recalled his middle son Bashar from London where he had been studying to be an eye doctor. When Bashar took over the presidency after his father died in 2000 he was widely touted as a reformer. His inaugural speech made a point of emphasizing reform language. As recently as the end of March, American officials were still referring to him as a reformer. It is fairly simple to trace the arc of his father's career to the current regime. Before Hafez took over as president, the regime ruling Syria was divided in two camps, those focused on social reform and those who sought safety with the iron fist of the military. When Bashar took over, he maintained the system his father had established by promoting siblings and cousins to positions of prestige in the military and business world. Bashar has taken steps to liberalize the economy, opening the Damascus Stock Exchange, permitting private banks, lowering interest rates, and cutting subsidies. While the economy has grown, the benefits are enjoyed most by those with connections to the ruling family. Bashar al-Assad's rule has been mainly focused on prolonging his own presidency.

When considering America's experiences in Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq and the Balkans, it is clear that the general rule of American humanitarian expedition is that the potential for American casualties needs to be low, there needs to be a clear definition of obligations, and most importantly, any kind of action must lead to stability in some way. Intervention in Libya will be the exception. The U.S.'s military might is not going to be an effective tool in supporting democratic movements in the Arab Spring. The recent protests have hinged on the domestic military's willingness to kill civilians on behalf of the ruling elite:

• The Tunisian revolution was allowed to run its own course as the military refused to shoot at protesters and the president fled. 
• The U.S. role in Egypt's revolution is more difficult to discern. Hosni Mubarak was cooperative with U.S. goals and the U.S. was willing to turn a blind eye to his dictatorship. When protests started, the administration dithered on outright support of the Tahrir Square protesters. 
• In Yemen, the Obama administration has not applied pressure on its erstwhile partner in the War on Terror, President Saleh, to allow democratic reforms. This probably has more to do with the fact that Yemen is a nightmare waiting to happen. The country has gone through two civil wars, the last one in 1994. The national government's control is non-existent outside the capital, there is a strong secessionist movement in the south, and tribal warlords. Yemen is widely regarded as the most heavily armed population in the world, its water supply is dwindling, and khat use is rampant. Oil reserves make up 75% of government revenues, account for 90% of exports, and will dry up within a decade. It has the same population of its neighbor Saudi Arabia and 25% of the land mass. The average age is 18. Yemen is also host to the most active Al-Qaeda franchise. These are all elements that do not bode well for the future.
• In Bahrain, home of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, Obama stopped at simply urging restraint in the vicious crackdown of protesters. 
• In the case of Syria, the U.S. just passed tougher sanctions targeting president Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle, the European Union agreed on similar sanctions. These are largely symbolic, sanctions are an artifact from a bygone era that now serve to hinder, but by no means will they uproot regimes. With Syrian - U.S. relations on the rocks for years, there are probably few economic relations that sanctions would actually affect. 

Gaddafi's regime is an easy target. The man is an international pariah, and it was clear that no one would lift a finger to help him if the U.S. and NATO dropped the hammer on him. Once a prominent Pan-Arabist he is widely hated amongst Arab League states, he asks European governments to humiliate themselves before allowing access to Libyan oil, he ordered the Lockerbie Bombing, and he is still blamed for disappearing the Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr. He has restyled himself as a Pan-Africanist and a few years ago he was anointed the "King of Kings" by a collection of African tribal kings. When the Libyan civil war started a delegation of heads of state and foreign ministers fronted by South African premier Jacob Zuma attempted to broker a peace deal that essentially said that the rebels would give up their arms and Gaddafi would think about maybe making some reforms. Gaddafi soured his inter-African relationships by treating his peers as junior partners.

Syria is a horse of a different color. The regime is a favorite client of Iran, receiving training, supplies, and weapons. The two countries also share a defense pact. While Syria's military may not be on par with that of the U.S., they have been very active in stifling American objectives in the region in a variety of ways: 

• actively supporting Hamas and Hezbollah attacks on Israel.
• funneling militants into Iraq to fight the American occupation.
• building a secret nuclear reactor in a rogue act that unsettled its neighbors in a region in which secretive nuclear facilities are a sensitive issue i.e. Israel's unacknowledged nuclear weapons, Iraq's alleged attempts to build a nuclear bomb, tensions regarding Iran's efforts to establish themselves as a nuclear force.
• controling the Lebanese government through bribes and extortion.

National Public Radio featured a story about inevitable change in Syria, but with the level of brutality used to quash protests, the Syrian rebellion seems more likely to follow the trajectory of Iran 2009, when protesters were murdered and tortured, and ultimately the movement was successfully suppressed. The root causes of the rebellion will be left to simmer. John McCain rightly said that Syrian protesters should not expect a military intervention. Although disheartening, it is better to be up front about what support the U.S. can offer rather than tepidly offer support and then hang rebels out to dry like Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War in 1991. There will not be a military solution to Syria, but what the U.S. could do is use its influence in the World Trade Organization to accept Syria, which has applied twice and been rejected both times. In exchange, President Assad would have to step down and agree to disassemble the familial controls over the government, economy, and security forces. This is highly unlikely considering that Syria relies heavily on the patronage of Iran and the acquiescence of Russia on the UN Security Council.

Most Syrians have only known the chaos of the pre-Assad rule and the tyrannous reign that has been going on in the 40 years since, and any proposed transition will be raise the specter of violence seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and recent attacks on women and religious minorities in Egypt. After 40 years of brutalizing political dissidents and snuffing out Islamists, there are plenty whose yearning for justice will not be satisfied by having Assad sidelined and may seek retribution.

Syria presents a tempting prize for intervention advocates. Syria is vital to myriad nations' security, energy, democratic, and economic plans. For interventionists, the ideal outcome would be unplugging Syria as Iran's link to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah. Also, the secret peace talks with Israel brokered by Turkey would be cemented after being broken off because of the 2009 Israeli conflict with Hamas. Thirdly, the long border with Iraq would remain quiet (Assad had quietly shut down the border to militants years ago). Syria produces modest quantities of oil and natural gas, but its location makes it a key hub for pipeline networks. Also, the economy is largely underdeveloped, but it had been making baby steps in becoming slightly more cosmopolitan. But none of this will be possible through violence. Forcibly removing the ruthless dictator and his inner circle would leave a greater void than was left in Iraq. There needs to be an orderly transition of power and that would require Assad to voluntarily hand over the reins. Unfortunately, if a country with strong diplomatic, economic, and security ties to Syria, like Turkey, cannot persuade the Assad regime to curb the violence, then the U.S. has few effective options and will be relegated to waiting in the wings.