Man cannot live on foreign policy alone. As a younger man I used to listen to French hip-hop from time to time. Perhaps the most influential group in the history of French hip-hop was a group called IAM. They were based out of the cosmopolitan port city of Marseille. They used a great deal of ancient Egyptian iconography to discuss contemporary issues and Islam in France indirectly, akin to The Crucible and Joseph McCarthy.
While francophone rap may not be completely accessible, the cool transcends language barriers.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2rEdM5x4DU
(embedding the video was not permitted)
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Friday, February 18, 2011
Protests in Damascus
1,500 people protested after a traffic cop beat up a shop keeper's son.
Syria News Wire has a good perspective about why this protest is different from others in the region:
Syria's economy is mostly centrally planned, but the government has been taking big steps over the last few years to liberalize the economy and open up its market. Like Bahrain, Syria's Alawite community is a minority sectarian/ethnic group controls the vestiges of power. But what distinguishes Syria is that the security forces keep such a tight grip on dissenters that there does not seem to be much of an appetite for people to risk the consequences (physical punishment, professional harm, indefinite detention) to protest the regime. People are so wary of drawing the attention of the secret police, or mukhabarat, that they use "the Germans" to reference the Alawites.
There is also the lingering effects of when the current president's father razed parts of the Syrian city Hama to quash a revolt by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. Various estimates put the fatalities around 30,000, not to mention the arrest and torture of Brotherhood sympathizers in the aftermath. Tom Friedman has an excellent chapter in his book From Beirut to Jerusalem called "Hama Rules." (The chapter starts on page 76 and the analysis starts on 87.) Basically, there are two kinds of defeats; the first in which the embers for revenge or conflict still burn and the second in which the defeat is so crushing that the will and resources for any future conflict have been completely exhausted.
Syria may tolerate protesters as long as they do not directly challenge the regime, but anyone willing to cross that line will be punished quickly and severely.
Syria News Wire has a good perspective about why this protest is different from others in the region:
They chant “the Syrian people will not be humiliated”, interspersed with, “shame, shame” and “with our soul, with our blood, we sacrifice for you Bashar”. That’s a very Syrian way of saying they were furious at the police, not the president. Also, note there was no chanting of “the people want the fall of the regime” (the words used in Tunisia and Egypt, and now in Yemen and Bahrain).While middle class frustration at the corruption, excessive security forces, and stagnant economy were the driving factors, the twist on Bahrain is that the Monarchy are Sunnis whose ties to the island do not stretch as far back as those of the majority Shiite population. Unhappiness with the discriminatory practices of the Sunni ruling class have been heightened foreseeable end of their oil reserves. Estimates give Bahrain 10 to 15 years before they run out of oil. Yemen is being ripped apart by militant tribes in the north and Marxist separatists in the south.
Syria's economy is mostly centrally planned, but the government has been taking big steps over the last few years to liberalize the economy and open up its market. Like Bahrain, Syria's Alawite community is a minority sectarian/ethnic group controls the vestiges of power. But what distinguishes Syria is that the security forces keep such a tight grip on dissenters that there does not seem to be much of an appetite for people to risk the consequences (physical punishment, professional harm, indefinite detention) to protest the regime. People are so wary of drawing the attention of the secret police, or mukhabarat, that they use "the Germans" to reference the Alawites.
There is also the lingering effects of when the current president's father razed parts of the Syrian city Hama to quash a revolt by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. Various estimates put the fatalities around 30,000, not to mention the arrest and torture of Brotherhood sympathizers in the aftermath. Tom Friedman has an excellent chapter in his book From Beirut to Jerusalem called "Hama Rules." (The chapter starts on page 76 and the analysis starts on 87.) Basically, there are two kinds of defeats; the first in which the embers for revenge or conflict still burn and the second in which the defeat is so crushing that the will and resources for any future conflict have been completely exhausted.
Syria may tolerate protesters as long as they do not directly challenge the regime, but anyone willing to cross that line will be punished quickly and severely.
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Obama Effect in Egypt
There are many parallels between Egypt and the U.S. during Obama's campaign and presidency. In both countries there was widespread unhappiness, primarily regarding the economy. The president was swept out of office by thousands, if not millions, of people who had never been involved in politics before. Following was a sense of euphoria at the ouster of the old regime, but so were elevated expectations for quick solutions to a variety of problems.
Unfortunately for the people of Egypt, the economy, culture of corruption, and absence of human rights will not be ameliorated overnight. Much like Obama's supporters who are relatively new to politics, those that participating in the January 25th protests will find that politics are a grind and solutions will necessitate compromise. It's hard to say how much of the energy of the protests will dissipate over time, especially if the 30 year old state of emergency persists and no substantial constitutional reforms are made.
The protesters have in their favor an incredible capacity to organize and motivate. It seems as though the demonstrators will persevere to dismantle the kabuki democracy that Mubarak had in place. It will be interesting to see what role Mohamed ElBaradei and Wael Ghonim will have in the future.
Unfortunately for the people of Egypt, the economy, culture of corruption, and absence of human rights will not be ameliorated overnight. Much like Obama's supporters who are relatively new to politics, those that participating in the January 25th protests will find that politics are a grind and solutions will necessitate compromise. It's hard to say how much of the energy of the protests will dissipate over time, especially if the 30 year old state of emergency persists and no substantial constitutional reforms are made.
The protesters have in their favor an incredible capacity to organize and motivate. It seems as though the demonstrators will persevere to dismantle the kabuki democracy that Mubarak had in place. It will be interesting to see what role Mohamed ElBaradei and Wael Ghonim will have in the future.
Thursday, February 10, 2011
What Happens if Mubarak Steps Down?
Rumors are circulating today that Hosni Mubarak will step down tonight. The army chief of staff spoke to the crowd in Tahrir Square and said, "All your demands will be met." In addition, the military council met without Mubarak, who normally is the chair of the council. As I am writing, it is impossible to know if Mubarak will truly step down, or if this will be another weak attempt to placate the protesters. Whether it is now or in September, post-Mubarak Egypt will have several groups in play to shape the new government. It seems unlikely that the military or the old hands from Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) will be able to keep the current system in place and simply replace Mubarak at the top. Overwhelming demand for broader, democratic changes will most likely win out in the end. The challenge will be determining who will step forward to represent the diverse factions in Tahrir Square.
The ouster of Mubarak is not the only goal of the protests. They demand the dismantling of his dictatorial system in order to prevent another autocrat from taking over. Egypt's emergency law allows for security forces to arrest and torture with impunity. Also, the constitution allows the president to appoint half the upper house of parliament. One of the most important steps toward a democratic future would be to lift bans on political parties. Punishing corruption in the legal avenues and guaranteeing elections that can operate without coercion from the security forces are also big, but necessary steps toward real reform.
The wild card in this situation is the role of the military. Initially seen as non-partisan force allowing open expression by protesters, public perception changed last week when air force fighter jets buzzed Tahrir Square and the army personnel stationed around the square stood by as pro-Mubarak thugs/plain clothes police officers attacked civilians. In addition, Human Rights Watch reports that they have documented over one hundred arrests of protesters and many cases of arbitrary torture, often right near Tahrir Square. However, the army also eventually began to arrest pro-Mubarak troublemakers. As Egypt approaches the precipice of change, the army has made vague statements about preventing the country from sliding into chaos, and acknowledging that the people's will must be recognized. Mubarak and his newly minted vice president Omar Suleiman (head of intelligence) have also warned that if protesters are unwilling to make some compromises, the military will take power in a "coup."
Nevertheless, today the military's promise and Mubarak's anticipated departure have raised expectations to a level that will only be satisfied with a significant step forward. Friday promises to be the biggest day of protests yet (gathering after Friday prayers is generally when the biggest protests occur across the broader Middle East). Having Mubarak step aside and hand the reigns to Suleiman will not be enough to quell the protests. Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal has already left Egypt and it seems unlikely that someone as closely identified with the regime as Omar Suleiman would be an acceptable replacement. As a veteran of the '62 war in Yemen as well as the '67 and '73 wars with Israel, Suleiman is believed to have significant support within the higher ups of the military. Also, he has never been a member of the ruling NDP, but that fun fact will do little to counter Suleiman's image as an NDP man.
The biggest deficit in the uprising is perhaps also its most important strength. The protesters are representative of a wide range of Egyptian life, including age, gender, occupation, and class. It is unlikely that the entire government will be scrapped, but no single faction would be capable of faithfully representing the vast and divergent set of interests held by the whole group. Right now the most visible individuals among the protesters have been Mohamed ElBaradei, Wael Ghonim, and a few members of the Muslim Brotherhood that had unproductive meetings with Suleiman earlier in the week. It remains to be seen if the uniting power of rebellion against an authoritarian leader can be translated into a functioning government where fair compromises between groups can be struck. As Mubarak's presidency seems to be coming to its end, all eyes will be on Egypt as they work out these complex issues on the path toward representative democracy.
The ouster of Mubarak is not the only goal of the protests. They demand the dismantling of his dictatorial system in order to prevent another autocrat from taking over. Egypt's emergency law allows for security forces to arrest and torture with impunity. Also, the constitution allows the president to appoint half the upper house of parliament. One of the most important steps toward a democratic future would be to lift bans on political parties. Punishing corruption in the legal avenues and guaranteeing elections that can operate without coercion from the security forces are also big, but necessary steps toward real reform.
The wild card in this situation is the role of the military. Initially seen as non-partisan force allowing open expression by protesters, public perception changed last week when air force fighter jets buzzed Tahrir Square and the army personnel stationed around the square stood by as pro-Mubarak thugs/plain clothes police officers attacked civilians. In addition, Human Rights Watch reports that they have documented over one hundred arrests of protesters and many cases of arbitrary torture, often right near Tahrir Square. However, the army also eventually began to arrest pro-Mubarak troublemakers. As Egypt approaches the precipice of change, the army has made vague statements about preventing the country from sliding into chaos, and acknowledging that the people's will must be recognized. Mubarak and his newly minted vice president Omar Suleiman (head of intelligence) have also warned that if protesters are unwilling to make some compromises, the military will take power in a "coup."
Nevertheless, today the military's promise and Mubarak's anticipated departure have raised expectations to a level that will only be satisfied with a significant step forward. Friday promises to be the biggest day of protests yet (gathering after Friday prayers is generally when the biggest protests occur across the broader Middle East). Having Mubarak step aside and hand the reigns to Suleiman will not be enough to quell the protests. Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal has already left Egypt and it seems unlikely that someone as closely identified with the regime as Omar Suleiman would be an acceptable replacement. As a veteran of the '62 war in Yemen as well as the '67 and '73 wars with Israel, Suleiman is believed to have significant support within the higher ups of the military. Also, he has never been a member of the ruling NDP, but that fun fact will do little to counter Suleiman's image as an NDP man.
The biggest deficit in the uprising is perhaps also its most important strength. The protesters are representative of a wide range of Egyptian life, including age, gender, occupation, and class. It is unlikely that the entire government will be scrapped, but no single faction would be capable of faithfully representing the vast and divergent set of interests held by the whole group. Right now the most visible individuals among the protesters have been Mohamed ElBaradei, Wael Ghonim, and a few members of the Muslim Brotherhood that had unproductive meetings with Suleiman earlier in the week. It remains to be seen if the uniting power of rebellion against an authoritarian leader can be translated into a functioning government where fair compromises between groups can be struck. As Mubarak's presidency seems to be coming to its end, all eyes will be on Egypt as they work out these complex issues on the path toward representative democracy.
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