Nuclear Iran

The recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran said that the Islamic Republic has taken steps to acquire dual use (civilian and military) nuclear technology as well as testing some of the base components of nuclear weapons. Much of the recent discourse has centered around an Israeli strike on Iran's key facilities. While this strategy has worked for Israel in the past, bombing will not take the Iranian nuclear program offline. At best, a military strike will delay weaponization by a few years, but the long-term effect of an attack would be counter-productive by underscoring the Iranian need for the ultimate deterrent. A diplomatic solution is the best bet for preventing a nuclear armed Iran from creating a Middle East Cold War.

The first question that should be asked is whether it matters if Iran develops a nuclear arsenal. After the Iranian revolution ousted the American-installed Shah in 1979, Iran has an extensive history of kidnapping Americans in addition to assisting in the 1983 bombing of American Marine barracks in Beirut. Iran's open patronage of militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas as means of furthering their influence in the region increases the frightening possibility of a nuclear device being used against a regional rival. From Iran's perspective, the incentive to acquire a deterrent that would insure against invasion is abundantly clear based on its recent history. Iran was involved in a brutal eight-year war that involved chemical weapons after it was invaded by Iraq. After 9/11, the United States invades Afghanistan which shares Iran's eastern border. Later, George W. Bush groups Iran with Iraq before invading the latter. Worrisome hypothetical situations easily come to mind when considering the introduction of a nuclear weapon, but mutually assured destruction is not a given. The Cold War never erupted into an open war and the network of aligned countries for indirect conflict is already established, but without the ideological foundation. Those opposed to a nuclear Iran in addition to the U.S. would be Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Britain, and France. Iran's coalition is a mix between nations vociferously supporting the Islamic Republic's right to nuclear power (Venezuela, Brazil, etc), Russia and China whom support and protect it in the United Nations Security Council, and non-state organizations in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain. In this scenario the real danger is similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis in which tensions run high, communication is almost nil, and erroneous assumptions could lead to a nuclear exchange.

Israel's foreign policy toward hostile neighbors has consistently relied on preemptive strikes, establishing deterrence by disproportionately reacting to attacks, and refusing to comment on its military capacity or action in other countries. Israel has bombed a reactor in both Iraq and Syria and succeeded in meeting their short term goals. There was no retaliation and only verbal condemnation by the international community. Geographically, Israel is a tiny country and its cities are some of the most densely populated in the world. If it were to suffer a nuclear attack, retaliation might not even be an option. A study organized by the FBI found that the forensic evidence left behind by a nuclear detonation could take months to trace back to its origin.



Bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would be exponentially more difficult than previous operations. In both previous cases, Israel's objective was to destroy a single reactor. Iran has 15 nuclear facilities, they are are near population centers, and the Fordow reactor (capable of producing weapons grade material) is buried deep within a mountain. Not only is Fordow impossible to attack with conventional bombing, but it is near Qom, the epicenter of scholarship for the dominant denomination of Islam in Iran, Shiism. Given that the various sites are spread across a large area and situated among population centers there would likely be a high number of casualties for both sides. The 2009 protests after the Iranian regime's vote rigging and subsequent infighting between President Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei would be forgotten as the regime could solidify its control as nationalistic fervor would come to a boil. The isolative diplomatic position of the Islamic Republic would harden and the value of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against regime change would grow. Any civilian casualties would affirm the wildest suspicions of every conspiracy theorist that paints the U.S. and Israel with the same villainous broad brush.

The role for the U.S. in this situation is unclear. On one hand the U.S. has put an incredible amount of political, military, and financial support behind the only functioning democracy in the Middle East. But the allegiance cuts both ways and the potential for the U.S. to be dragged into a potential conflict is quite high. When Israel bombed the Syrian reactor in 2007, the initial reactions from American officials indicated that the U.S. was not aware of the attack until it hit the news. Given the unfavorable image the U.S. has in the Middle East, the best option would be for the U.S. to do what it can to restrain Israel and organize international pressure on Russia and China. China is Iran's largest trading partner and it has been susceptible to international pressure in the past, but those moments were in the run up to the 2008 Olympics. Sanctions have been effective in stifling Iran's economic growth.

With so much of Iran's economy controlled by the country's religious leaders and Revolutionary Guard, sanctions have solidified the regime's grip on the economy. 60% of Iran's economy is composed of oil revenues which is not quite enough to allow the government to finance programs without care like some of its gulf neighbors. While it is the fourth largest oil producer in the world, the Islamic Republic lacks sufficient facilities to refine oil into gasoline, so it exports oil and imports gasoline and depresses the price of gas with enormous subsidies. The Iranian government also subsidizes bread and several other household staples which eat a large part of the national budget. Attempts to cut subsidies have been wildly unpopular and have hamstrung economic reforms. Sanctions will be effective if they increase resentment towards the regime and trap it in a lose-lose situation in which it cannot cut subsidies and cannot take steps to improve the economy.

Any American action that would impede Iran's ability to supply oil would cause the price of gasoline, heating, shipping, produce, etc. to rise and make a bad economic situation in the U.S. worse. The political backlash from American constituents would severely decrease American policy makers' appetite for further action against Iran. It's true that the U.S. does not import oil from Iran, but oil is sold on an international market and any dip in Iranian exports will mean that China, Japan, India, Italy, and South Korea will have to look elsewhere and prices will soar. For sanctions to be effective, Iran's other trade partners would need to be willing to cooperate. In sum, the United States can effectively disrupt Iran's aspirations of developing nuclear weapons with diplomacy and sanctions. Iran has struggled to complete a project that other countries have accomplished in considerably less time (China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea). It would not be too much of a leap to infer that sanctions have greatly hampered Iran's progress. Pressuring Russia and China does not often result in cooperation with American interests, but the U.S. has strong ties with most of Iran's biggest trade partners, the aforementioned Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Italy. Attacking Iran would temporarily set back a weapons program and make any future interactions unlikely to yield results.

Russia and China Hang the Syrian People Out to Dry

A resolution introduced to the United Nations Security Council that sought an unspecified military action in Syria failed to pass. The resolution was vetoed by Russia and China. Both countries have abysmal human rights records and frequently respond to dissent with violence, both are afraid of military intervention on humanitarian grounds becoming a slippery slope. Russia has been especially vocal about the intervention in Libya original, explicit purpose to protect civilians from Gaddafi's troops in Misrata transforming into regime change.

Around 3,000 people have died since the protests began in March and there does not seem to be any internal developments that will lead to a breakthrough. The opposition has organized a group to direct the political and military operations, similar to Libya's Transitional National Council. So far the Syrian opposition have little to show for their efforts with the exception of taking hold of Rastan, a fairly small city in the Homs region. Much of the Syrian National Council's success was attributed to soldiers defecting. In the beginning stages of the protests, reports surfaced of army and intelligence personnel breaking away, but these departures were not indicative of underlying schisms in the military that would eventually lead to significant fractures. The Syrian government seems to have cauterized their defection problem when videos emerged showing soldiers who refused to attack civilians were shot by intelligence officers.

The prospects of President Bashar al-Assad leaving office or serious reforms are looking dire. Structurally, the military and intelligence services continue to be the foundation of Assad's power, with the military under control of his brother and intelligence being directed by his brother-in-law. There will be no Egypt style military coup to usher out the long standing dictator. The United States and Europe have imposed sanctions, but Iran continues to support its client state which to negate international sanctions. Syria has been vital to Iran's foreign interests. Syria actively acts as both agitator and the hub for Iranian weapons, funds, and intelligence for Hamas and Hezbollah. While Iranian support for Shiite militant groups poured across the border into southern Iraq, Syria funneled combatants into the Sunni areas. Syria also has an extensive history of interfering in Lebanese affairs, as well as recently encouraging Palestinian protesters to cross the border into Israel. Some of the leadership of both Hezbollah and Hamas are hosted in Damascus.

Now that the UN Security Council is a dead end with its allies protecting them in the UN Security Council, it appears as if the Assad regime will simply have to wait out the protests. The media continues to draw comparisons between Libya and Syria, but the case of  a distant outlier. It is almost impossible to imagine that the Arab League will support intervention in Syria as it did in Libya. Recently, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev called for Assad to step down or reform, but Medvedev's comments should be regarded as criticism from a concerned individual and not an indication of Russian foreign policy. Similar comments from Vladimir Putin would signal a real change.

The Syrian opposition appears bereft of outside support. Unless they can quickly organize themselves into a coherent political block with an armed wing that can seize and hold towns against the onslaught of the Syrian military, Syria will return to the status quo, much as Iran did in 2009.

Arab Spring Scorecard

Tunisia: Ben Ali is exiled in Saudi Arabia with his haul of gold.

Egypt: Hosni Mubarak is currently on trial while also dealing with serious health issues. Until a few days ago, his trial was broadcast on live TV. The ailing former head of state was too ill to sit in a chair, so he laid on a bed inside a cage.

Yemen: President Saleh seems to be under an informal house arrest in Saudi Arabia after being hospitalized there following an attack. Saleh has been out of the hospital for some time and frequently promises to return to Yemen.

Iran: Protests earlier this year were quickly and brutally put down. There has been little in the way of demonstrations since.

Libya: Gaddafi has a million dollar bounty on his head. Rebels are tightening their grip on Tripoli as the opposition Transitional National Council tries to quell fears about its ability to rule and to rule justly.

Syria: Bashir al-Assad recently made promises of reforms and municipal elections while continuing his horrific crackdown on civilians and militants alike. This seems to be another phase in Assad's cycle of empty promises and mass murder.

Major Field Experiments, Yes. Can we get some basic data for where we're working too?

Chris Blattman recently posted an article entitled “One of the nicest field experiments I have ever seen” praising a study that showed positive impacts from a women-focused voter awareness campaign. He is so impressed with the impact evaluation study that he ends the article with a death note to the other form of studying development tools, “if the era of simple NGO program evaluation is not dead, it is gasping its dying breath.” http://chrisblattman.com/2011/07/21/one-of-the-nicest-field-experiments-i-have-seen/

I wholeheartedly agree that “simple program evaluation” is passé as a tool for adding to our knowledge about development tools. NGO program evaluations are useless for extrapolating findings.  They study a single situation after a program has been employed. Even for their own context, they can’t really show impact (change due to the program,) because they have no counter-example proving the change wouldn't have occurred in the absence of the program. Even if a program evaluation compares multiple programs, it is impossible to tell if the difference is due to the difference in what the programs did and not how the programs were run. Program evaluations essentially miss 95% of the reality happening even within their own parameters. If Blattman is right that this method is dead, I’m not sure who will be at the funeral. But to put "program evaluations" and impact evaluations side-by-side is like comparing apples and apple trees.

   

Randomized control experiments cost millions of dollars (mostly provided by philanthropic donors). The interventions studied must be organized entirely with the study in mind, from the beginning. They often need to include a pilot study and can take over two years to complete. These studies are cumbersome, but there is great pay off in terms of answering specific questions about human economic and social behavior. It would be great if more field practitioners got more contact with the resulting articles.

However, great as they are, today’s rare experimental studies still leave a huge gap in making international development interventions more successful.  Imagine you are in the field. Instead of just doing your job in the international industry and following the log-frame passed down to you, you decide, one day, to step back and reflect on what is really needed. You need data. But wait, there is no money to collect data about the five villages you want to work with, much less the other five villages you eventually want to compare your work with so you can see if it made a difference. The only way to get funding is to act, not to assess. Substantial pre-project data gathering is just unrealistic in the current development industry. So you give up and carry-on taking orders with a sneaking suspicion that the resources you are delivering, even with winks and nods to the findings of published experimental studies, aren’t really connecting with the beneficiaries.

It is time we start to think about how local, quality research can be funded in all project sites and potential project sites. Substantial and consistent pre-project data collection (beyond rare University studies and 12^th hour number pulling for project proposals) is as critical to the success of development efforts as learning the answers to questions like “are women more likely to vote if they are encouraged to do so?” Taking it one step further, communities themselves could actually get involved and excited by regular data gathering. If they could see data about themselves presented data back to them (in culturally appropriate formats), there could be all kinds of otherwise unexplainable positive impacts occurring across many different projects. But this requires support and funding. It is worth building some branches (regular local data collection) from the trees (randomized control studies) even if we just let the apples (program evaluation) rot.

President Saleh's First Appearance Since the Attack

I apologize for the long layoff between posts. I've been on the road for a while.

Watching Yemeni President Saleh's prerecorded video, I was struck by how drastically different he looks.
Before he was injured in an attack on the presidential compound, he was commonly seen in a suit or military uniform, tidy mustache, dyed hair. After, the wardrobe is significantly different, perhaps to reflect his temporary/new residency in Saudi Arabia, not to mention the white beard in lieu of the black mustache. Also, you can seen signs of his wounds in the skin on the end of his nose, lips, around the ear, and under the chin. He looks to have had some of his eyebrows burned off. CNN reported that he also had a collapsed lung. It remains to be seen if he will truly return to Yemen to continue a presidency that stretches back to 1978. He had previously floated the idea of stepping down in exchange for immunity, but outraged protesters conveyed the idea that immunity was not acceptable. In the video he vaguely mentions reforms, but he also refers to the attack as an "accident" and an "incident." This is not language that indicates he has really come to terms with the end of his reign.

Before

After

Top Reads

A Quiet Revolution, in Beirut - NYTimes.com
Lebanon has been outside of the wave of protests washing across the Middle East and North Africa. This is an interesting look at how life in Lebanon is dominated by which religious sect one belongs to. Laws regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc are all dependent on religion. A person can convert to a religion that has a more favorable inheritance law and switch back afterwards.  Lebanon's confessional system was originally set up to ensure equitable representation of the 16 religions. The architects of this system thought it would encourage cross-sectarian cooperation, but in reality it has further entrenched the identification with coreligionists instead of a national identity. Tony Dauod is advocating for a laws that emphasize nationality.

Tony Daoud in Lebanon with a sign that reads “Square of Change.” Photograph by Matthew Cassel for The New York Times

Blackwater Founder Builds Mideast Mercenary Army to Put Down Revolts | Danger Room | Wired.com
This is an older article, but it is a fascinating look at Erik Prince's efforts to build a private army of African and Latin American veterans to put down revolts in the Persian Gulf. Prince's comparison of Blackwater's relationship to the U.S. military and FedEx's to USPS is thought provoking to say the least, especially in light of the Navy Seal operation to kill Osama Bin Laden. Also, a foreign fighters that make up the domestic security force in Abu Dhabi would have fewer reservations about killing civilians that the mercenaries do not identify with.

Just in case you happen to hate your job today… – Chris Blattman


My Syria, Awake Again After 40 Years - NYTimes.com
The son of the Syrian president that preceded Hafez al-Assad comments on the regime's delusional belief that Syria can be quarantined from the rest of the world.

Legalizing Drugs Won't Stop Mexico's Brutal Cartels - By Elizabeth Dickinson | Foreign Policy
Elizabeth Dickinson explains that drug cartels in Mexico are expanding into other enterprises. I thought one of the more interesting ideas she mentions, but does not fully explore is that the global drug trade is a $320 billion industry, so perhaps the cartels are more desperate to hold on to their market share since the pie is getting smaller in their area.

Obama Can Stop the Killing in Syria - By Tony Badran | Foreign Policy
Tony Badran's suggestion that Syria could be brought to heel by the usual diplomatic actions that signal at the U.S.'s displeasure. Recalling ambassadors or ending diplomatic ties entirely will not work with a country that had scant relations with the U.S. to begin with. As long as Syria is supported financially by Iran and protected in the UN by a Russian veto.

Libya - Ten non-violent options | Carne Ross

What we can do to bring down dictators | Carne Ross | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

Carne Ross, of Independent Diplomat, presents diplomatic options to address the crisis in Libya. He presents a range of options that should be considered part of a wider range of tools, not an exclusive course of action.

Here's a Map of the Humanitarian Crisis Hotspots in Libya (Don't Tell Gaddafi) | Fast Company

iRevolution | From innovation to Revolution
A blog that explores best practices for protesters.

The Green Wave

Before the Arab Spring, there were the Tehran protests after the elections in 2009. Before Mohamed Bouazizi and Hamza Ali al-Khateeb, there was Neda Agha-Soltan. After battle wounds forced Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh to leave the country and pro-democracy protests ousted dictators in Tunisia and Egypt, casual observers can be forgiven for assuming that every uprising has a democratic trajectory. But the protests following a sham election in Iran had a different ending. The Iranian establishment crushed each new wave of protests with an astonishing brutality. In Egypt the police progressed from batons to tear gas and briefly to goons with pistols. Iranian security services' initial response was to shoot civilians indiscriminately.  Reformist tumult in Iran was eventually extinguished.

Earlier this year I saw an excellent documentary about the 2009 protests called The Green Wave. The film maker use of animation and video footage push the sense of panic and horror described in the the personal narratives of the protests. The movie also interviews with some prominent Iranian candidates, reform activists, and politicians. The Green Wave is an incredible look inside such an important country that is too often characterized by its bombastic leadership.

Here are some Q & A's with the director:

Q&A: The Green Wave | Sundance Film Festival

Documenting Iran's Green Wave | Human Rights Watch

There is no Military Solution for Syria

The violent repression of pro-democracy protesters in Syria presents a difficult challenge for President Obama and his policy makers that is unlike any other in the Arab Spring. Since Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on March 28th that there will be no military intervention in Syria on March 28th, the severity of the government crackdown against protesters has escalated significantly. The Syrian intelligence services, or mukhabarat, is reported to have shot soldiers who refused to fire on protesters, snipers have been clearing the streets, a journalist was sent to an Iranian detention center, civilians fleeing into Lebanon have been turned over to the Syrian military, corpses showing signs of torture have been left in public squares, a mass grave outside Daraa has been uncovered, and tanks have shelled cities.

Some criticize Obama for inconsistent standards for intervention, considering his decision to step in during the backlash against protesters in Libya. The truth is that the issues in Syria are very different and an intervention by the U.S. military would not lead to a quick and decisive result.

Syria is a country of 22 million people in an area similar in size to North Dakota. The Assad family has been in control of the government, military, and economy since Hafez al-Assad appointed himself president in 1970. Hafez, the current president's father, ousted President Nureddin al-Atassi and Ba'ath Party Secretary General Salah Jadid that he had recently helped install in 1963. After decades of tumultuous leadership, Hafez al-Assad consolidated power by stocking the military and ubiquitous secret police with family and members of his Alawite religious sect, a group which accounts for 10% of the population. With the security services as the backbone of his regime, the final piece of the puzzle was establishing a patronage system for wealthy Sunnis. This created a system were business interests were dependent on Hafez's favoritism. Aside from his cult of personality portraying him as an omniscient, infallible father figure, his indelible legacy is razing the city of Hama (See Hama Rules for more). Hafez's oldest son Basil had been groomed to succeed  as president until Basil died in a car crash in the early 90's. After Basil's death, Hafez recalled his middle son Bashar from London where he had been studying to be an eye doctor. When Bashar took over the presidency after his father died in 2000 he was widely touted as a reformer. His inaugural speech made a point of emphasizing reform language. As recently as the end of March, American officials were still referring to him as a reformer. It is fairly simple to trace the arc of his father's career to the current regime. Before Hafez took over as president, the regime ruling Syria was divided in two camps, those focused on social reform and those who sought safety with the iron fist of the military. When Bashar took over, he maintained the system his father had established by promoting siblings and cousins to positions of prestige in the military and business world. Bashar has taken steps to liberalize the economy, opening the Damascus Stock Exchange, permitting private banks, lowering interest rates, and cutting subsidies. While the economy has grown, the benefits are enjoyed most by those with connections to the ruling family. Bashar al-Assad's rule has been mainly focused on prolonging his own presidency.

When considering America's experiences in Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq and the Balkans, it is clear that the general rule of American humanitarian expedition is that the potential for American casualties needs to be low, there needs to be a clear definition of obligations, and most importantly, any kind of action must lead to stability in some way. Intervention in Libya will be the exception. The U.S.'s military might is not going to be an effective tool in supporting democratic movements in the Arab Spring. The recent protests have hinged on the domestic military's willingness to kill civilians on behalf of the ruling elite:

• The Tunisian revolution was allowed to run its own course as the military refused to shoot at protesters and the president fled. 
• The U.S. role in Egypt's revolution is more difficult to discern. Hosni Mubarak was cooperative with U.S. goals and the U.S. was willing to turn a blind eye to his dictatorship. When protests started, the administration dithered on outright support of the Tahrir Square protesters. 
• In Yemen, the Obama administration has not applied pressure on its erstwhile partner in the War on Terror, President Saleh, to allow democratic reforms. This probably has more to do with the fact that Yemen is a nightmare waiting to happen. The country has gone through two civil wars, the last one in 1994. The national government's control is non-existent outside the capital, there is a strong secessionist movement in the south, and tribal warlords. Yemen is widely regarded as the most heavily armed population in the world, its water supply is dwindling, and khat use is rampant. Oil reserves make up 75% of government revenues, account for 90% of exports, and will dry up within a decade. It has the same population of its neighbor Saudi Arabia and 25% of the land mass. The average age is 18. Yemen is also host to the most active Al-Qaeda franchise. These are all elements that do not bode well for the future.
• In Bahrain, home of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, Obama stopped at simply urging restraint in the vicious crackdown of protesters. 
• In the case of Syria, the U.S. just passed tougher sanctions targeting president Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle, the European Union agreed on similar sanctions. These are largely symbolic, sanctions are an artifact from a bygone era that now serve to hinder, but by no means will they uproot regimes. With Syrian - U.S. relations on the rocks for years, there are probably few economic relations that sanctions would actually affect. 

Gaddafi's regime is an easy target. The man is an international pariah, and it was clear that no one would lift a finger to help him if the U.S. and NATO dropped the hammer on him. Once a prominent Pan-Arabist he is widely hated amongst Arab League states, he asks European governments to humiliate themselves before allowing access to Libyan oil, he ordered the Lockerbie Bombing, and he is still blamed for disappearing the Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr. He has restyled himself as a Pan-Africanist and a few years ago he was anointed the "King of Kings" by a collection of African tribal kings. When the Libyan civil war started a delegation of heads of state and foreign ministers fronted by South African premier Jacob Zuma attempted to broker a peace deal that essentially said that the rebels would give up their arms and Gaddafi would think about maybe making some reforms. Gaddafi soured his inter-African relationships by treating his peers as junior partners.

Syria is a horse of a different color. The regime is a favorite client of Iran, receiving training, supplies, and weapons. The two countries also share a defense pact. While Syria's military may not be on par with that of the U.S., they have been very active in stifling American objectives in the region in a variety of ways: 

• actively supporting Hamas and Hezbollah attacks on Israel.
• funneling militants into Iraq to fight the American occupation.
• building a secret nuclear reactor in a rogue act that unsettled its neighbors in a region in which secretive nuclear facilities are a sensitive issue i.e. Israel's unacknowledged nuclear weapons, Iraq's alleged attempts to build a nuclear bomb, tensions regarding Iran's efforts to establish themselves as a nuclear force.
• controling the Lebanese government through bribes and extortion.

National Public Radio featured a story about inevitable change in Syria, but with the level of brutality used to quash protests, the Syrian rebellion seems more likely to follow the trajectory of Iran 2009, when protesters were murdered and tortured, and ultimately the movement was successfully suppressed. The root causes of the rebellion will be left to simmer. John McCain rightly said that Syrian protesters should not expect a military intervention. Although disheartening, it is better to be up front about what support the U.S. can offer rather than tepidly offer support and then hang rebels out to dry like Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War in 1991. There will not be a military solution to Syria, but what the U.S. could do is use its influence in the World Trade Organization to accept Syria, which has applied twice and been rejected both times. In exchange, President Assad would have to step down and agree to disassemble the familial controls over the government, economy, and security forces. This is highly unlikely considering that Syria relies heavily on the patronage of Iran and the acquiescence of Russia on the UN Security Council.

Most Syrians have only known the chaos of the pre-Assad rule and the tyrannous reign that has been going on in the 40 years since, and any proposed transition will be raise the specter of violence seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and recent attacks on women and religious minorities in Egypt. After 40 years of brutalizing political dissidents and snuffing out Islamists, there are plenty whose yearning for justice will not be satisfied by having Assad sidelined and may seek retribution.

Syria presents a tempting prize for intervention advocates. Syria is vital to myriad nations' security, energy, democratic, and economic plans. For interventionists, the ideal outcome would be unplugging Syria as Iran's link to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah. Also, the secret peace talks with Israel brokered by Turkey would be cemented after being broken off because of the 2009 Israeli conflict with Hamas. Thirdly, the long border with Iraq would remain quiet (Assad had quietly shut down the border to militants years ago). Syria produces modest quantities of oil and natural gas, but its location makes it a key hub for pipeline networks. Also, the economy is largely underdeveloped, but it had been making baby steps in becoming slightly more cosmopolitan. But none of this will be possible through violence. Forcibly removing the ruthless dictator and his inner circle would leave a greater void than was left in Iraq. There needs to be an orderly transition of power and that would require Assad to voluntarily hand over the reins. Unfortunately, if a country with strong diplomatic, economic, and security ties to Syria, like Turkey, cannot persuade the Assad regime to curb the violence, then the U.S. has few effective options and will be relegated to waiting in the wings.

Retirees Volunteer to Work in Fukushima

A former nuclear engineer is organizing a group of retired colleagues to help stabilize the damaged Fukushima power plant in Japan. The group led by Yasuteru Yamada has yet to be given the green light by the government, but negotiations are ongoing. Yamada succinctly explained why he is volunteering to work on the plant:

"I am 72 and on average I probably have 13 to 15 years left to live," he says. "Even if I were exposed to radiation, cancer could take 20 or 30 years or longer to develop. Therefore us older ones have less chance of getting cancer."

Courage is Contagious

In Beirut, someone painted "COURAGE IS CONTAGIOUS" along a highway.
It would be harder to find something that so clearly underpins the ripple effect of the Arab Spring. So often we have heard protesters say that previous protests gave them the bravery to demand change. The outcomes in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, and Syria are still up in the air. But nevertheless, the measure of heart needed to risk injury or death at the hands of one's own countrymen and call for the removal of decades old institutions is awe inspiring.


(AFP/Joseph Eid)

Yemen: A Nightmare We Will Never Wake Up From

I was writing about Yemen for a slightly longer piece and I thought I briefly list the elements that make Yemen a perpetual disaster:

• The country has gone through two civil wars. The previous civil war pitted the royalist forces and Saudi military against the republicans and Egypt. The most recent one in 1994 after South Yemen seceded just four years after unification. One of the grievances that was never resolved was that Yemen's oil fields are in South Yemen, yet the region does not benefit from the oil revenue. Unfair distribution of oil wealth by the central government, especially when the oil is extracted outside the home of the capital has been a major source of instability in Sudan, Iraq, and Angola. 
• The national government's control is non-existent outside the capital, there is a strong secessionist movement in the south, and tribal warlords in the north.
• There has been a Zaidi Shiite insurgency, often referred to as Houthis, in the north since 2004. Saudi Arabia launched attacks against the Houthis afraid that trouble in Yemen would spill over the border and into the kingdom.
• Yemen is widely regarded as the most heavily armed population in the world, its water supply is dwindling, and khat use is rampant. 
• Oil reserves make up 75% of government revenues, account for 90% of exports, and will dry up within a decade. 
• It has the same population of its neighbor Saudi Arabia and 25% of the land mass. The average age is 18. When speaking at the University of Minnesota, Fareed Zakaria noted that one of the causes of the Arab Spring was an increase in the percentage of the population that are young men. 
• Yemen is also host to the most active Al-Qaeda franchise. 

These are all elements that do not bode well for the future.

Reaction: President Obama's Middle East Speech

Now that I've had a chance to sleep on it, I want to respond to Obama's speech. There was a lot of hullabaloo about what wasn't in the speech--but in a speech addressing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the most populous Arab country moving towards democratic rule for the first time in its history, and women's rights in the Middle East, there was enough for the President to talk about.

My initial reaction is that the speech was well-crafted and it highlighted several important issues facing the Middle East and North Africa. That said, I was disappointed by how much of the speech was focused on Israel and Palestine. This is an issue which is so immensely complicated and burdened with decades of resentment and hate that it overshadows the events of the Arab Spring. Without question, the issue of Palestinian sovereignty and Israeli security deserves the attention of diligent, patient, and earnest policy makers. In the wider context, the conflict is relevant in that autocratic regimes across the region use Israel as a a scapegoat in lieu of addressing the serious needs of their people. There is also the issue of the Palestinian populations in neighboring countries; Syria and Lebanon each have around 400,000 Palestinians and almost three million in Jordan. In what was heralded as a speech on the Arab Spring, this speech shifted to a prelude to Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu's impending visit.

Also, there was a lot of grousing on Twitter about the omission of Saudi Arabia. I was surprised that Bahrain was mentioned, as well as using the term "occupation" when referring to Israel. But calling out Saudi Arabia would really be going against the grain of the relationship between the kingdom and the United States. It is, undoubtedly, disheartening that there is seems to be such little pressure exerted by the U.S. in addressing issues like prohibiting women from driving, arresting Filipino migrant workers for holding secret Catholic services, and supporting Orwellian surveillance that ensures that unmarried people walk separately from to each other. With everything else that is going on, these issues are better left to closed-door discussions.

Obama did an admirable job of personalizing the frustration of individuals like Mohamed Bouazizi who set the wave of revolution in motion after setting himself on fire last December. Bouazizi was college-educated and he eked out a meager living selling fruit. His frustration with police harassment and his unfulfilled aspirations culminated in his now well-known suicide. Obama drew attention to the countries in the Middle East that have been free from colonial rule for half a century, but their citizens have been denied any say in their government and their access to their economies has been similarly restricted. With so much emphasis on the individuals and their lack of personal options, I would like to have seen more specific information about how the United States is going to assist the average person in the Middle East instead of pouring resources into sieve-like governments. What about strengthening civic institutions and fighting corruption? Perhaps the biggest obstacle to any American program in the Middle East is the deep mistrust of American intentions, so how is this deep rooted suspicion to be alleviated? Obama also mentioned American misgivings about the Muslim world--what can be done to build trust?

All in all, a nice speech, but what truly could have been a milestone policy declaration left a tinge of disappointment in that there were not more specifics about how America's economic might, its spirit of innovation, and its unparalleled universities could be of service to people who have only known discontent, fear, and  frustration.

Full text of the speech.

Here is a video of the speech in its entirety:

Is the World a Better Place for Having an International Criminal Court?

AMICC Representative Participates in University of Minnesota Law School Debate on the US Involvement in the ICC


By Kristen Rau, Juris Doctor Candidate University of Minnesota Law School and Master of Public Policy Candidate, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota; and Jordan Shepherd, Juris Doctor, University of Minnesota Law School.

The University of Minnesota Law School’s Federalist Society, Law School Democrats, and International Law Society co-hosted a panel debate on March 22, 2011, “Is the World a Better Place for Having an International Criminal Court?” Speaking in support of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was Duane Krohnke, University of Minnesota Adjunct Professor and Provisional Organizer of the Minnesota Alliance for the International Criminal Court. David Wippman, Dean of the University of Minnesota Law School and a former director in the Office of Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs of the National Security Council under the Clinton administration, took the neutral position. Professor Eugene Kontorovich of Northwestern University School of Law, argued the anti-ICC position.

Professor Kontorovich questioned both the ICC’s advisability and its constitutionality, beginning with the latter to obviate the need to consider the former. Professor Kontorovich asserted that U.S. membership would be unconstitutional for two reasons. First, U.S. membership would expose U.S. citizens to trials without the structures of an Article III court. While non-Article III courts may be constitutionally permissible in limited circumstances, these do not include core issues such as criminal trials. Second, U.S. membership would deprive criminal defendants of certain procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to a grand jury.

Professor Kontorovich emphasized that the ICC is not the first international court that has solicited U.S. support and been resisted, highlighting 19th century British slave-trade courts in which the U.S. declined to participate. Most treaty negotiations, and the constitutional argument that spelled the death knell of U.S. involvement, were led by John Quincy Adams. Noting that the constitutionality of U.S. membership could be saved by limiting the ICC’s jurisdiction to exclude all non-universal jurisdiction crimes, Professor Kontorovich identified the unlikelihood of such a development due to the Rome Statute’s prohibition of reservations.

Professor Kontorovich concluded with a survey of reasons for which the ICC could be considered a failure: the sluggishness of the trial process, the failure to convict any defendant, and the absence of empirical research demonstrating meaningful deterrent effects. Professor Kontorovich further suggested that the ICC could actually extend conflict by inhibiting peace deals when militants or regimes see international criminal prosecution as unavoidable in spite of ceasing or surrendering. Moreover, Professor Kontorovich referred to Kenya, where piracy trials were halted as several government officials came under ICC scrutiny for their alleged role in the 2008 election violence, for the proposition that the ICC may do more harm than good. In response to questions from the audience, Professor Kontorovich suggested that ICC supporters must revisit the fundamental approach of the Court and recognize that it, like Nuremburg, was an emphatic endorsement of victors’ justice rather than a triumph of international justice. Finally, Professor Kontorovich argued that the recent definition of the crime of aggression within the ICC’s jurisdiction could push states like the U.S. even further from ratification, since military campaigns such as the bombing of Kosovo could be categorized as “aggression.”

Professor Krohnke presented the affirmative argument that the ICC does, indeed, constitute a positive development in international justice, concluding that the U.S. should ratify the Rome Statute. This argument is based on six propositions: 1) the Court will prosecute and punish those guilty of the most serious crimes, 2) the Court provides deterrence from such crimes, 3) the Court promulgates the truth about these crimes, 4) the Court assists victims, 5) the Court is active and appears to be permanent, making U.S. involvement pragmatic, and 6) U.S. involvement and membership is proper under the Constitution. Professor Krohnke suggested that the ICC operationalizes international human rights norms stemming from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and seeks to replace impunity with accountability. Despite its slow development and initial operationalization, he suggested, the ICC will develop into an important global institution. Citing forthcoming research by Professor Kathryn Sikkink in The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (forthcoming in 2011 by W.W. Norton), Professor Krohnke argued that there is empirical evidence supporting the deterrent effect of international and domestic prosecutions of human rights crimes. Moreover, Professor Krohnke suggested that the ICC contributes to promulgation of the truth, supports victims’ assistance, and fosters pragmatic international relations.

Professor Krohnke addressed the U.S. constitutional criticisms of the ICC, noting that there is no evidence that its text bars U.S. involvement. He cited Missouri v. Holland to illustrate the broad application of the treaty power in relation to the Constitution and the protective requirements of executive agreement, the advice and consent of the Senate, and a two-thirds Senate vote for ratification. Professor Krohnke concluded with several responses to Professor Kontorovich’s position. Professor Krohnke suggested that ICC critics rely too heavily on early U.S. resistance to 19th century British slave court, particularly given the possibility that U.S. resistance was due to the political influence of southern U.S. states or to an American inclination to avoid post-Revolution entanglement with Great Britain.

Dean Wippman suggested that the ICC is fundamentally “a good idea that has been badly implemented.” Failing to command the political and financial support it needs, the ICC cannot live up to the hopes of its supporters. Yet, neither can it live down to the fears of its critics because it does appear to reinforce human rights norms and contribute to stability in some post-conflict societies.

Dean Wippman identified practical constraints, including jurisdictional loopholes, investigation and enforcement limitations, and procedural hurdles, as particular problems. Moreover, Dean Wippman noted the limited evidence of deterrence or social education that ICC supporters have long claimed. For example, Dean Wippman suggested that ICC trials may demonstrate that responsibility for human rights abuses rests with individuals; alternatively, they may also confirm pre-existing social biases. Dean Wippman acknowledged, however, that the specter of the ICC may effectively marginalize nationalist politicians and may, as in Latin America, allow national governments to shift power balances in favor of peace agreements.

Dean Wippman, modestly disclaiming expertise in constitutional law, addressed the constitutional question briefly. He noted that Professor David J. Scheffer, a major contributor to the drafting of the Rome Treaty, has argued persuasively for the ICC’s constitutionality. Further, the Clinton administration signed on to the Rome Statute with Department of Justice advice that U.S. signing and eventual ratification were permissible under the U.S. Constitution.

The debate concluded with a lively question-and-answer session, in which the participants fielded incisive questions and further developed and responded to arguments. Professor Kontorovich conceded that the ICC is not an insidious institution that is causing great harm to U.S. interests even though he disputes its effectiveness. Professor Krohnke emphasized the progressive development of this young but growing institution, especially the expected conclusion this summer of the first trial of Thomas Lubanga of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, Dean Wippman stated that the disparate impact of the ICC across states and conflicts behooves supporters and critics alike to recognize its potentially variable effects around the globe.

Mahesha Subbaraman, the President of the local student chapter of the Federalist Society, moderated the debate but did not declare a winner. Nor was there any vote taken of the more than seventy-five students and faculty in attendance to determine who "won" the debate. The debate highlighted many issues surrounding the ICC and helped to raise awareness of this developing institution.

*Cross-posted from The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court (http://amicc.blogspot.com/2011/03/amicc-representative-in-minnesota.html)

Osama: The Photo and the Burial

There is no substantial reason for releasing the photo of a dead Osama Bin Laden. The only purpose it could serve is to add sensational grist to the mill of 24 hour news. Releasing the picture will only reinforce the idea that any trifling conspiracy theory is valid until proven otherwise; whether that be where Barack Obama was born or if OBL is truly dead. If the White House were lying about tracking and killing the world's most wanted terrorist, couldn't aforementioned terrorist burst the president's bubble by releasing another of his videos? And if this was a hoax, wouldn't the prankster be better served releasing the photo right before election day?

Withholding the picture is also important for the same reason OBL was buried at sea. He was more important to the global jihadist movement as an icon than an operator. Burial at sea prevents his final resting place from becoming a monument. The remains of Adolf Eichman, the architect of the Holocaust, were similarly scattered in the Mediterranean. Bin Laden's ideology hinges on aggrandizing his conflict to that of a holy war so that his followers believe that terrorism is a matter greater than deposing dictators or forcing Western powers to retract. Al-Qaeda seeks to build up its combatants as folk heroes, 9/11 organizer Khalid Sheik Mohahmed told a courtroom that he is like George Washington. Responding in kind would be confirming their self-proclaimed elevated status as an existential threat and would also be detrimental to the United States's safety. Terrorists should not be presented as madmen bent on razing the U.S., but as criminals, murderers, hypocrites who would just as soon kill the people the claim to be fighting for. Terrorists should not be given a forum for dramatic speeches, their burials should not be an occasion for ceremony. Combating terrorism is as much a conflict of ideas and the U.S. should not feed the discourse, but tamp down the grand language terrorism thrives on.

The Bin Laden Family

With Osama Bin Laden dominating the news and projections of what the future holds, I thought I would share something that I found absolutely fascinating when I first heard it a few years ago. Steve Coll spoke at the London School of Economics in support of his book The Bin Ladens. The book examines modernization and globalization in Saudi Arabia through the perspective of the Bin Laden family. Coll looks at the incredible story of Osama's father Mohamed who started out as an one-eyed illiterate who made bricks out of clay and grew into the head of the second wealthiest family on the peninsula after becoming the al-Saud royal family's favorite palace builder. Osama's oldest brother Salem lived an incredible life, but even more so when juxtaposed with what Osama. He had been an aviation enthusiast, rock and roll aficionado, and international bon vivant. He often liked to bribe bands to let him sing "House of the Rising Sun," whether it be at Oktoberfest, wedding receptions, or Oscar parties.


MP3 
LSE Page

UPDATE:
This picture was in the Daily Telegraph and I think it highlights the dissonance of Osama Bin Laden's public persona juxtaposed with that of the normal arc of a person's life. This is during a family trip in Falun, Sweden. He is second from the right with the green shirt and blue bell bottoms.

Osama Bin Laden: The Militant, The Myth

Osama Bin Laden’s death was a stunning development for people around the world. We are faced with many questions about what comes next. Is the world a safer place? Yes. Nevertheless, will soldiers in Afghanistan stop worrying about improvised explosive devices? Will airport security no longer require passengers to remove their shoes? Can the U.S. pull troops out of Afghanistan tomorrow? Is the War on Terror over? No, unfortunately. The clearest take-away from Bin Laden's death is some measure of solace for the victims of 9/11, the men and women of the armed services, and their families.

The emotional celebrations in front of the White House are understandably an important part of a national catharsis. However, the media's eagerness to capitalize on the charged national mood by offering a tidy summary is misleading. Although Bin Laden's death is undoubtedly a landmark in the War on Terror, it by no means represents crossing a finish line. We do not yet know how involved Bin Laden was in the training, financing, and planning of Al-Qaeda's operations in recent years. If he had become disconnected from the core leadership while on the lam, then his death may not cause a serious operational disruption to the group. The symbolic significance is undeniable, but on its own, still may not be sufficient to cause the collapse of the organization. Audrey Kurth Cronin, author of "How Terrorism Ends," argues that "decapitation" is usually not enough independent of other factors. The recent democratic uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa have done a great deal to de-legitimize Al-Qaeda's founding premise that only asymmetrical holy war can bring about change. Couple that shifting landscape with the dramatic increase in drone strikes  in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Bin Laden's death may be enough to end Al-Qaeda as we know it.

9/11 was the most spectacular and traumatizing terrorist attack this generation has ever seen. After the attacks on New York and Washington, Bin Laden's legend grew to iconic status as the head of a terrorist organization with global reach and an agenda to take down the world's only super power. Before that terrible day, Bin Laden had been on par with the likes of Joseph Kony, the MRTA, Muammar Gaddafi, Idi Amin; murderous oddities on the fringe of American consciousness. Then entire world then knew the name Osama Bin Laden, a mass murderer and ideologue who delusionally strove for a transcontinental religious empire. For jihadist wannabes, he became an oversimplified brand whose subtext was deliverance from injustice, disrespect, and the ruin brought about by modernity. Other extremists took his mantle and started their own Al-Qaeda franchises in Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and even China. Terrorist groups similar to Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda will not stop targeting Americans. Extreme ideologies without the capability to confront a juggernaut like the U.S. military will always rely on ambushes, hiding amongst civilians, prying opportunities in open, cosmopolitan societies. As Bin Laden became more notorious, his role in directing attacks diminished, but the spread of his ideas is what made him most dangerous.

The death of Osama Bin Laden is certainly worth celebrating and while watching the revelry outside the White House I was struck by how young some of the people were. Some must have been children in 2001. It dawned on me that we too had bought into an oversimplified, grandiose idea of who Bin Laden was and what he stood for. As if all these extremist militants under his mantle would quietly go away, as if in an action movie. After 9/11, sympathy and support poured in from around the world and it was squandered in a wasteful war that had nothing to do with the attacks on two cities most emblematic of the United States. While rousing support for the War on Terror the United States became shamefully at ease with the blanket suspicion of Muslims. Islam was portrayed as a hateful monolith. There was no distinction made between secular dictators, militant groups with local agendas, and those touting a global holy war. Americans were told that breaking a tradition of anti-torture that was as old as their country was beyond question. Patriotism was said to trump the trampling of civil liberties. The United States had killed its boogieman, but terrorism did not start with Bin Laden and it will not end with his death. Justice has indeed been done, but the ideals that make the United States so great have been stained.


 

1: "Year of the Drone" New America Foundation

Syria: Father Like Son?

Protests against the Syrian government have escalated significantly since tame protests in Damascus about heavy handed police in February. Various human rights groups estimate the number of deaths to be around 200 since then. The tone of protests has changed dramatically from portraying the rowdy secret police as a couple of bad eggs to demanding a complete overhaul of the government. Some of the protesters are openly calling for Assad to leave, but it is not clear that this is the majority opinion. 40 years after his father took power in a coup and more recently claiming that Syria was immune to the tumult affecting Tunisia and Egypt, Assad stands at a crossroads, does he step down or does he put quash the protests with the kind of brutality that will extinguish any inkling of revolution?

What he chooses largely depends on the military's willingness to kill its countrymen. There have already been reports of the secret police shooting soldiers who refused to fire on protesters. Assad has already gone through the standard progression of blaming foreign troublemakers, raising wages of government employees, promising reforms, firing his cabinet, and lifting the emergency law. The regime has taken to Twitter to fight the protesters by flooding the microblogging site with inane posts using the #Syria hashtag in order to dilute pro-reform tweets. None of this has worked to quell the protests and killing civilians has poisoned any chance that Assad could negotiate a compromise. The escalation forebodes Friday and Saturday to be the most violent days yet in Syria.


* The emergency law is gone in name only, Assad put in new laws that prohibit any political dissenters.

UPDATE: Instead of referencing back to an older post, here an excellent account of the Hama Massacre, in which the current president's father quashed a revolt by the Muslim Brotherhood and razed the town. He killed upwards of 10,000 people and Hama served as a deterrent for those who would challenge the Assad regime. "Hama Rules." (The chapter starts on page 76 and the analysis starts on 87.)

Top Reads

The Pakistan government is pissed about Raymond Davis and drone attacks. Spencer Ackerman has a good insight into why nothing will really change.

Gaddafi's Ukranian nurse (now retired) talks about her time in Libya.

A scout for the Mumbai massacre says he is tied to Pakistan's intelligence service.

A handy guide to insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Two Somali women in Minnesota are going to trial for sending money to terrorist groups in East Africa.

Nautical Nomads

The Guardian has a feature by Johnny Langenheim with photos from James Morgan about the Bajau people, nomads who have in boats for hundreds of years. The piece brings up several interesting themes that are common in tales of globalization: a unique culture in a changing world, environmental concerns confronting modernity, a unique place in international trade, and unusual pets, to say the least.

Enal, photographed playing with his pet shark in Wangi Wangi, Indonesia

There's a great video from the Guardian after the jump

Egyptian Dissident Sentenced by Military Court

This does not bode well for the people who came out and supported the Tahrir Square protests that lead to the ouster of long time dictator Hosni Mubarak. Maikel Nabil Sanad, an Egyptian blogger who was arrested by Egyptian intelligence and interrogated during the protests, was just sentenced to three years in jail for a blog post attacking the military regime. One of his biggest accusations is that the military was secretly arming the police who were shooting protesters. He also accuses the junta of trying bamboozle the pro-democracy movement into believing that the military is supporting the revolution while they plan to replace Mubarak at the top instead of replacing the entire system.

One swallow does not a summer make, but it will certainly make pro-democracy factions in Egypt nervous of the new regime implementing genuine reforms.

Here is a picture of Maikel holding a sign saying, "we refuse the army stealing the people's revolution!"

Thanks to SO for translating.

Book Review: The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes You a Happy Birthday

Having just finished Neil MacFarquhar’s excellent book, The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes You a Happy Birthday, I am impressed at the true breadth and depth of his experience in the Middle East and North Africa. The book is an absolute must read for anyone intrigued by the recent unrest in the Arab world.

MacFarquhar worked as a journalist in the region for the better part of 30 years. The bookopens with his upbringing in Libya on whatamounted to an Texas oil company colony. From this vantage point, he relates funny anecdotes and explores cultural phenomena that are widely misunderstood in the United States. He covers a range of topics: the impact of satellite TV, the intrusiveness of secret police, fatwas, jihad, tribal relations, and the capacity and tolerance for reform in several countries. MacFarquhar illuminates causes of Arab ill will towards the U.S. and areas where the people of the region agree with American policy. The latter part of the book examines the potential for U.S. policy goals (i.e. American national security, democracy, human rights, security for Israel, etc.) and how the U.S. government could better cooperate with their Arab counterparts. He has three big policy shifts that would require a great deal of bravery for a politician of any stripe, as well as an earnest effort to recognize differences in political currents within the meaningfully diverse nations in the Middle East and North Africa.

1. Speak to the citizenry about their concerns on their level. For example, we should not dictate that education curriculums have to change despite that the status quo has served to create foot soldiers for Al Qaeda. U.S. policy makers should listen to parents’ concerns about the schools’ inadequacies and ask questions that highlight mutual concerns without dictating specific curricular changes. This explicit common ground will apply indirect pressure on regimes. MacFarquhar says that the U.S. focuses too much on short-term goals. The U.S. is willing to turn a blind eye to kabuki democracies in exchange for cooperation on energy issues or the war on terror. MacFarquhar points out that criticizing the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia would have likely led to the loss of an ally. He adds that an open society could oppose Washington because its policies might go against the grain of popular opinion.
2. Vocally support change regardless of how its weak proponents are or if the goals mirror U.S. interests. He suggests that the U.S. should only throw its support behind reform advocates that have stellar reputations in their home countries and try to avoid individuals attempting to capitalize on U.S. support by echoing key policy vernacular. He adds that it would probably be better to strengthen civic institutions rather than push for elections. In many countries, the political parties are anemic at best, with the most active opposition parties being the Islamist parties. He says that this could be problematic for U.S. policy makers as a group similar to Hamas could ultimately win elections and, likewise, create an impasse. (insert note about political participation & concentrated interest). He adds that, “Washington should not lose any opportunity to be seen as a friend of the little guy, and not just a friend of the princes.” (p.356)
3. The U.S. should condemn all repression, especially the near-constant harassment that most people suffer at the hands of the secret police. The U.S. was very vocal about tyranny in the Soviet bloc and most Middle East secret police were mentored by Soviet agencies. “Real stability and security should be rooted in stronger political systems.” MacFarquhar argues that most Arabs do not want to trade in despotic secular regimes for despotic theocratic regimes. The author states that what people want is less corruption and better government services, and they think that religious parties are the only ones strong enough to deliver. He argues that U.S. foreign policy should return to "doing the right thing," and that this would go a long way to fix the U.S.'s image problem. He argues that real security will be the product of focusing foreign policy on a broad, reasonable bulk of Middle Eastern citizens rather than compromising American values for the assured results of a dictator.

Top Reads

The reformers behind the rebels in Libya

"Assessing Egypt's First Ballot Box"

Syria has greater strategic importance than Libya

Where is the Line in Libya?

Rebels in Libya are back on the offensive after an extensive air campaign led by the United States. Last night President Obama outlined the American role in Libya. The noise pollution coming from the 24 hour news channels & the Republicans distracts from the serious issues we should be discussing about the U.S.'s role in Libya. The U.S. has taken sides with the rebels and unless Muammar Gaddafi is removed from power, he may lash out at American citizens in the same manner as the Lockerbie Bombing.

The President said that the intervention by the coalition does not entail regime change, citing Iraq as an example of regime change leading to a power vacuum that will lead to more bloodshed. The president also indicated he is hoping that the Libyan military will turn against Gaddafi. This is the best case scenario considering the operational constraints imposed by American interests and the rebels' limited capabilities to wage war. Starting with the most important in descending order: loss of American lives, the American reputation abroad, costs, and American ideals. The first and third are relatively obvious, I'll explore the second and fourth more.

I consider the American reputation second most important because the reputation of the U.S. is irreversibly stained in many countries that are key to national interests. Whether it be deposing Mosadegh in Iran in the 1950's, replacing drug crops with cows in Lebanon, or the Iraq WMD debacle, many residents of countries that undergo American intervention suspect that the U.S. has something up its sleeve and it will only be a matter of time before naked self interest becomes apparent. In the world of psychology, the phenomenon is called confirmation bias. Let's say a person has an inkling that people with red hair are bad drivers. If they get cut off and see the driver has red hair, the person will take it as further reinforcement of their belief and add up anecdotes to prove their theory. When a person with dark hair cuts them off or a redhead avoids such vehicular transgressions, the biased person is also unlikely to fairly adjust their previous belief to match reality. In the modern world, the U.S. military no longer faces a uniformed enemy with the accompanying tanks and fighter jets but now engages enemies without uniforms who use asymetrical tactics (IED, ambushes, suicide bombers, etc), nestled amongst the civilian population. These groups also elicit civilian support, and the line between soldier and citizen is deeply blurred. In this new setting, winning hearts and minds is the keystone to our success. This matters in Libya, particularly, because loss of innocent civilian life in an oil rich, muslim country does much to fuel the belief that American self-interest trumps all other values, and undermines alliances with countries that want to avoid appearing similarly uncompassionate.

The fourth constraint is a wild swing from the pragmatic to idealistic. Gaddafi's penchant for bizarre clothing, lady-ninja bodyguards, and marathon rants have shifted focus on his persona as a merciless tyrant to that of international laughing stock. Military intervention is likely to have saved thousands, if not tens of thousands, from certain doom. Our American sense of justice and perhaps the responsibility inherent in power make intervention to prevent a massacre very appealing to many Americans. But history has taught us that seemingly simple interventions can turn out to be very expensive endeavors. There is no single rule that can be universally applied to every country. Instead, decisions are made based on a cold calculation contrasting beneficial outcome with American casualties.

The most important question not being discussed concerns the extent of our involvement. What outcomes would be acceptable for a U.S. withdrawal? What if Gaddafi were to agree to a ceasefire and then waited for international attention to wane before quietly beginning to cull dissidents from Eastern Libya? Is there a situation that the U.S. and the allied forces would be compelled to restart air strikes? Gaddafi is the living embodiment of a pariah, he is reviled across the Arab world as well as the West. Even his title as the, "King of Kings of Africa," gets little traction with African rulers who do not need his handouts. Left to his own devices, Gaddafi will most likely return to business as usual, abusing his citizens, making Western countries bend over backwards for access to Libyan oil, crazy speeches, and crazier outfits. But if he remains in power, he will have an ax to grind will the coalition countries.

Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions in Carl Sagan's "Earth the Pale Blue Dot"

This is incredible, and very touching.

Coverage of Japan

24 hour news channels are a funny thing. It is not unreasonable to expect that there will be some basic level of journalistic standards, and having different opinions and perspectives from a range of staff is to be expected. With the proliferation of news sources comes an incentive to be first to break a story with little regard to reporting events accurately. With the 24 hour news channel, there is rarely enough news to fill the cycle. What is both a disservice to the viewers and simply disgusting behavior is the sensational manner in which CNN and Fox have been covering the tragedy in Japan. With over 10,000 dead, thousands more injured, homes destroyed, livelihoods lost, not to mention the radiation issue and the psychological trauma suffered, there is no shortage of topics worth discussing. Japan is also the world's third largest economy in addition to hosting over 26,000 American military personnel on the island of Okinawa alone.

The over the top graphics and ominous music belong in trailers for Michael Bay movies, not reports of a disaster that is going to have generational consequences. It seems that stations that try to add drama and tension to what are already highly dramatic situations are more concerned with keeping viewers on the hook with mini cliff hangers and fear mongering. I also find it unbelievable that every disaster necessitates that Anderson Cooper report on site in his smedium, black t-shirt and present himself as the locus of the suffering of millions of people. I fail to understand what it adds to news reporting to have a famous talking head on site instead of a field reporter. 

What's sad that all the concerned facial expressions and reverent tones will be gone as soon as people's lives are out of immediate danger. The cameras will not be there to cover the rebuilding process or the individuals piecing their lives back together. Just in the same way that they ignore the construction of democratic governments in Tunisia and Egypt.

Hip-hop français

Man cannot live on foreign policy alone. As a younger man I used to listen to French hip-hop from time to time. Perhaps the most influential group in the history of French hip-hop was a group called IAM. They were based out of the cosmopolitan port city of Marseille. They used a great deal of ancient Egyptian iconography to discuss contemporary issues and Islam in France indirectly, akin to The Crucible and Joseph McCarthy.

While francophone rap may not be completely accessible, the cool transcends language barriers.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2rEdM5x4DU
(embedding the video was not permitted)

Protests in Damascus

1,500 people protested after a traffic cop beat up a shop keeper's son.


Syria News Wire has a good perspective about why this protest is different from others in the region:

They chant “the Syrian people will not be humiliated”, interspersed with, “shame, shame” and “with our soul, with our blood, we sacrifice for you Bashar”. That’s a very Syrian way of saying they were furious at the police, not the president. Also, note there was no chanting of “the people want the fall of the regime” (the words used in Tunisia and Egypt, and now in Yemen and Bahrain).

 While middle class frustration at the corruption, excessive security forces, and stagnant economy were the driving factors, the twist on Bahrain is that the Monarchy are Sunnis whose ties to the island do not stretch as far back as those of the majority Shiite population. Unhappiness with the discriminatory practices of the Sunni ruling class have been heightened foreseeable end of their oil reserves. Estimates give Bahrain 10 to 15 years before they run out of oil. Yemen is being ripped apart by militant tribes in the north and Marxist separatists in the south.


Syria's economy is mostly centrally planned, but the government has been taking big steps over the last few years to liberalize the economy and open up its market. Like Bahrain, Syria's Alawite community is a minority sectarian/ethnic group controls the vestiges of power. But what distinguishes Syria is that the security forces keep such a tight grip on dissenters that there does not seem to be much of an appetite for people to risk the consequences (physical punishment, professional harm, indefinite detention) to protest the regime. People are so wary of drawing the attention of the secret police, or mukhabarat, that they use "the Germans" to reference the Alawites.


There is also the lingering effects of when the current president's father razed parts of the Syrian city Hama to quash a revolt by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. Various estimates put the fatalities around 30,000, not to mention the arrest and torture of Brotherhood sympathizers in the aftermath. Tom Friedman has an excellent chapter in his book From Beirut to Jerusalem called "Hama Rules." (The chapter starts on page 76 and the analysis starts on 87.) Basically, there are two kinds of defeats; the first in which the embers for revenge or conflict still burn and the second in which the defeat is so crushing that the will and resources for any future conflict have been completely exhausted.


Syria may tolerate protesters as long as they do not directly challenge the regime, but anyone willing to cross that line will be punished quickly and severely.