Now that I've had a chance to sleep on it, I want to respond to Obama's speech. There was a lot of hullabaloo about what wasn't in the speech--but in a speech addressing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the most populous Arab country moving towards democratic rule for the first time in its history, and women's rights in the Middle East, there was enough for the President to talk about.
My initial reaction is that the speech was well-crafted and it highlighted several important issues facing the Middle East and North Africa. That said, I was disappointed by how much of the speech was focused on Israel and Palestine. This is an issue which is so immensely complicated and burdened with decades of resentment and hate that it overshadows the events of the Arab Spring. Without question, the issue of Palestinian sovereignty and Israeli security deserves the attention of diligent, patient, and earnest policy makers. In the wider context, the conflict is relevant in that autocratic regimes across the region use Israel as a a scapegoat in lieu of addressing the serious needs of their people. There is also the issue of the Palestinian populations in neighboring countries; Syria and Lebanon each have around 400,000 Palestinians and almost three million in Jordan. In what was heralded as a speech on the Arab Spring, this speech shifted to a prelude to Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu's impending visit.
Also, there was a lot of grousing on Twitter about the omission of Saudi Arabia. I was surprised that Bahrain was mentioned, as well as using the term "occupation" when referring to Israel. But calling out Saudi Arabia would really be going against the grain of the relationship between the kingdom and the United States. It is, undoubtedly, disheartening that there is seems to be such little pressure exerted by the U.S. in addressing issues like prohibiting women from driving, arresting Filipino migrant workers for holding secret Catholic services, and supporting Orwellian surveillance that ensures that unmarried people walk separately from to each other. With everything else that is going on, these issues are better left to closed-door discussions.
Obama did an admirable job of personalizing the frustration of individuals like Mohamed Bouazizi who set the wave of revolution in motion after setting himself on fire last December. Bouazizi was college-educated and he eked out a meager living selling fruit. His frustration with police harassment and his unfulfilled aspirations culminated in his now well-known suicide. Obama drew attention to the countries in the Middle East that have been free from colonial rule for half a century, but their citizens have been denied any say in their government and their access to their economies has been similarly restricted. With so much emphasis on the individuals and their lack of personal options, I would like to have seen more specific information about how the United States is going to assist the average person in the Middle East instead of pouring resources into sieve-like governments. What about strengthening civic institutions and fighting corruption? Perhaps the biggest obstacle to any American program in the Middle East is the deep mistrust of American intentions, so how is this deep rooted suspicion to be alleviated? Obama also mentioned American misgivings about the Muslim world--what can be done to build trust?
All in all, a nice speech, but what truly could have been a milestone policy declaration left a tinge of disappointment in that there were not more specifics about how America's economic might, its spirit of innovation, and its unparalleled universities could be of service to people who have only known discontent, fear, and frustration.
Full text of the speech.
Here is a video of the speech in its entirety:
Friday, May 20, 2011
Monday, May 16, 2011
Is the World a Better Place for Having an International Criminal Court?
AMICC Representative Participates in University of Minnesota Law School Debate on the US Involvement in the ICC
By Kristen Rau, Juris Doctor Candidate University of Minnesota Law School and Master of Public Policy Candidate, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota; and Jordan Shepherd, Juris Doctor, University of Minnesota Law School.
The University of Minnesota Law School’s Federalist Society, Law School Democrats, and International Law Society co-hosted a panel debate on March 22, 2011, “Is the World a Better Place for Having an International Criminal Court?” Speaking in support of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was Duane Krohnke, University of Minnesota Adjunct Professor and Provisional Organizer of the Minnesota Alliance for the International Criminal Court. David Wippman, Dean of the University of Minnesota Law School and a former director in the Office of Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs of the National Security Council under the Clinton administration, took the neutral position. Professor Eugene Kontorovich of Northwestern University School of Law, argued the anti-ICC position.
Professor Kontorovich questioned both the ICC’s advisability and its constitutionality, beginning with the latter to obviate the need to consider the former. Professor Kontorovich asserted that U.S. membership would be unconstitutional for two reasons. First, U.S. membership would expose U.S. citizens to trials without the structures of an Article III court. While non-Article III courts may be constitutionally permissible in limited circumstances, these do not include core issues such as criminal trials. Second, U.S. membership would deprive criminal defendants of certain procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to a grand jury.
Professor Kontorovich emphasized that the ICC is not the first international court that has solicited U.S. support and been resisted, highlighting 19th century British slave-trade courts in which the U.S. declined to participate. Most treaty negotiations, and the constitutional argument that spelled the death knell of U.S. involvement, were led by John Quincy Adams. Noting that the constitutionality of U.S. membership could be saved by limiting the ICC’s jurisdiction to exclude all non-universal jurisdiction crimes, Professor Kontorovich identified the unlikelihood of such a development due to the Rome Statute’s prohibition of reservations.
Professor Kontorovich concluded with a survey of reasons for which the ICC could be considered a failure: the sluggishness of the trial process, the failure to convict any defendant, and the absence of empirical research demonstrating meaningful deterrent effects. Professor Kontorovich further suggested that the ICC could actually extend conflict by inhibiting peace deals when militants or regimes see international criminal prosecution as unavoidable in spite of ceasing or surrendering. Moreover, Professor Kontorovich referred to Kenya, where piracy trials were halted as several government officials came under ICC scrutiny for their alleged role in the 2008 election violence, for the proposition that the ICC may do more harm than good. In response to questions from the audience, Professor Kontorovich suggested that ICC supporters must revisit the fundamental approach of the Court and recognize that it, like Nuremburg, was an emphatic endorsement of victors’ justice rather than a triumph of international justice. Finally, Professor Kontorovich argued that the recent definition of the crime of aggression within the ICC’s jurisdiction could push states like the U.S. even further from ratification, since military campaigns such as the bombing of Kosovo could be categorized as “aggression.”
Professor Krohnke presented the affirmative argument that the ICC does, indeed, constitute a positive development in international justice, concluding that the U.S. should ratify the Rome Statute. This argument is based on six propositions: 1) the Court will prosecute and punish those guilty of the most serious crimes, 2) the Court provides deterrence from such crimes, 3) the Court promulgates the truth about these crimes, 4) the Court assists victims, 5) the Court is active and appears to be permanent, making U.S. involvement pragmatic, and 6) U.S. involvement and membership is proper under the Constitution. Professor Krohnke suggested that the ICC operationalizes international human rights norms stemming from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and seeks to replace impunity with accountability. Despite its slow development and initial operationalization, he suggested, the ICC will develop into an important global institution. Citing forthcoming research by Professor Kathryn Sikkink in The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (forthcoming in 2011 by W.W. Norton), Professor Krohnke argued that there is empirical evidence supporting the deterrent effect of international and domestic prosecutions of human rights crimes. Moreover, Professor Krohnke suggested that the ICC contributes to promulgation of the truth, supports victims’ assistance, and fosters pragmatic international relations.
Professor Krohnke addressed the U.S. constitutional criticisms of the ICC, noting that there is no evidence that its text bars U.S. involvement. He cited Missouri v. Holland to illustrate the broad application of the treaty power in relation to the Constitution and the protective requirements of executive agreement, the advice and consent of the Senate, and a two-thirds Senate vote for ratification. Professor Krohnke concluded with several responses to Professor Kontorovich’s position. Professor Krohnke suggested that ICC critics rely too heavily on early U.S. resistance to 19th century British slave court, particularly given the possibility that U.S. resistance was due to the political influence of southern U.S. states or to an American inclination to avoid post-Revolution entanglement with Great Britain.
Dean Wippman suggested that the ICC is fundamentally “a good idea that has been badly implemented.” Failing to command the political and financial support it needs, the ICC cannot live up to the hopes of its supporters. Yet, neither can it live down to the fears of its critics because it does appear to reinforce human rights norms and contribute to stability in some post-conflict societies.
Dean Wippman identified practical constraints, including jurisdictional loopholes, investigation and enforcement limitations, and procedural hurdles, as particular problems. Moreover, Dean Wippman noted the limited evidence of deterrence or social education that ICC supporters have long claimed. For example, Dean Wippman suggested that ICC trials may demonstrate that responsibility for human rights abuses rests with individuals; alternatively, they may also confirm pre-existing social biases. Dean Wippman acknowledged, however, that the specter of the ICC may effectively marginalize nationalist politicians and may, as in Latin America, allow national governments to shift power balances in favor of peace agreements.
Dean Wippman, modestly disclaiming expertise in constitutional law, addressed the constitutional question briefly. He noted that Professor David J. Scheffer, a major contributor to the drafting of the Rome Treaty, has argued persuasively for the ICC’s constitutionality. Further, the Clinton administration signed on to the Rome Statute with Department of Justice advice that U.S. signing and eventual ratification were permissible under the U.S. Constitution.
The debate concluded with a lively question-and-answer session, in which the participants fielded incisive questions and further developed and responded to arguments. Professor Kontorovich conceded that the ICC is not an insidious institution that is causing great harm to U.S. interests even though he disputes its effectiveness. Professor Krohnke emphasized the progressive development of this young but growing institution, especially the expected conclusion this summer of the first trial of Thomas Lubanga of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, Dean Wippman stated that the disparate impact of the ICC across states and conflicts behooves supporters and critics alike to recognize its potentially variable effects around the globe.
Mahesha Subbaraman, the President of the local student chapter of the Federalist Society, moderated the debate but did not declare a winner. Nor was there any vote taken of the more than seventy-five students and faculty in attendance to determine who "won" the debate. The debate highlighted many issues surrounding the ICC and helped to raise awareness of this developing institution.
*Cross-posted from The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court (http://amicc.blogspot.com/2011/03/amicc-representative-in-minnesota.html)
By Kristen Rau, Juris Doctor Candidate University of Minnesota Law School and Master of Public Policy Candidate, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota; and Jordan Shepherd, Juris Doctor, University of Minnesota Law School.
The University of Minnesota Law School’s Federalist Society, Law School Democrats, and International Law Society co-hosted a panel debate on March 22, 2011, “Is the World a Better Place for Having an International Criminal Court?” Speaking in support of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was Duane Krohnke, University of Minnesota Adjunct Professor and Provisional Organizer of the Minnesota Alliance for the International Criminal Court. David Wippman, Dean of the University of Minnesota Law School and a former director in the Office of Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs of the National Security Council under the Clinton administration, took the neutral position. Professor Eugene Kontorovich of Northwestern University School of Law, argued the anti-ICC position.
Professor Kontorovich questioned both the ICC’s advisability and its constitutionality, beginning with the latter to obviate the need to consider the former. Professor Kontorovich asserted that U.S. membership would be unconstitutional for two reasons. First, U.S. membership would expose U.S. citizens to trials without the structures of an Article III court. While non-Article III courts may be constitutionally permissible in limited circumstances, these do not include core issues such as criminal trials. Second, U.S. membership would deprive criminal defendants of certain procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to a grand jury.
Professor Kontorovich emphasized that the ICC is not the first international court that has solicited U.S. support and been resisted, highlighting 19th century British slave-trade courts in which the U.S. declined to participate. Most treaty negotiations, and the constitutional argument that spelled the death knell of U.S. involvement, were led by John Quincy Adams. Noting that the constitutionality of U.S. membership could be saved by limiting the ICC’s jurisdiction to exclude all non-universal jurisdiction crimes, Professor Kontorovich identified the unlikelihood of such a development due to the Rome Statute’s prohibition of reservations.
Professor Kontorovich concluded with a survey of reasons for which the ICC could be considered a failure: the sluggishness of the trial process, the failure to convict any defendant, and the absence of empirical research demonstrating meaningful deterrent effects. Professor Kontorovich further suggested that the ICC could actually extend conflict by inhibiting peace deals when militants or regimes see international criminal prosecution as unavoidable in spite of ceasing or surrendering. Moreover, Professor Kontorovich referred to Kenya, where piracy trials were halted as several government officials came under ICC scrutiny for their alleged role in the 2008 election violence, for the proposition that the ICC may do more harm than good. In response to questions from the audience, Professor Kontorovich suggested that ICC supporters must revisit the fundamental approach of the Court and recognize that it, like Nuremburg, was an emphatic endorsement of victors’ justice rather than a triumph of international justice. Finally, Professor Kontorovich argued that the recent definition of the crime of aggression within the ICC’s jurisdiction could push states like the U.S. even further from ratification, since military campaigns such as the bombing of Kosovo could be categorized as “aggression.”
Professor Krohnke presented the affirmative argument that the ICC does, indeed, constitute a positive development in international justice, concluding that the U.S. should ratify the Rome Statute. This argument is based on six propositions: 1) the Court will prosecute and punish those guilty of the most serious crimes, 2) the Court provides deterrence from such crimes, 3) the Court promulgates the truth about these crimes, 4) the Court assists victims, 5) the Court is active and appears to be permanent, making U.S. involvement pragmatic, and 6) U.S. involvement and membership is proper under the Constitution. Professor Krohnke suggested that the ICC operationalizes international human rights norms stemming from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and seeks to replace impunity with accountability. Despite its slow development and initial operationalization, he suggested, the ICC will develop into an important global institution. Citing forthcoming research by Professor Kathryn Sikkink in The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (forthcoming in 2011 by W.W. Norton), Professor Krohnke argued that there is empirical evidence supporting the deterrent effect of international and domestic prosecutions of human rights crimes. Moreover, Professor Krohnke suggested that the ICC contributes to promulgation of the truth, supports victims’ assistance, and fosters pragmatic international relations.
Professor Krohnke addressed the U.S. constitutional criticisms of the ICC, noting that there is no evidence that its text bars U.S. involvement. He cited Missouri v. Holland to illustrate the broad application of the treaty power in relation to the Constitution and the protective requirements of executive agreement, the advice and consent of the Senate, and a two-thirds Senate vote for ratification. Professor Krohnke concluded with several responses to Professor Kontorovich’s position. Professor Krohnke suggested that ICC critics rely too heavily on early U.S. resistance to 19th century British slave court, particularly given the possibility that U.S. resistance was due to the political influence of southern U.S. states or to an American inclination to avoid post-Revolution entanglement with Great Britain.
Dean Wippman suggested that the ICC is fundamentally “a good idea that has been badly implemented.” Failing to command the political and financial support it needs, the ICC cannot live up to the hopes of its supporters. Yet, neither can it live down to the fears of its critics because it does appear to reinforce human rights norms and contribute to stability in some post-conflict societies.
Dean Wippman identified practical constraints, including jurisdictional loopholes, investigation and enforcement limitations, and procedural hurdles, as particular problems. Moreover, Dean Wippman noted the limited evidence of deterrence or social education that ICC supporters have long claimed. For example, Dean Wippman suggested that ICC trials may demonstrate that responsibility for human rights abuses rests with individuals; alternatively, they may also confirm pre-existing social biases. Dean Wippman acknowledged, however, that the specter of the ICC may effectively marginalize nationalist politicians and may, as in Latin America, allow national governments to shift power balances in favor of peace agreements.
Dean Wippman, modestly disclaiming expertise in constitutional law, addressed the constitutional question briefly. He noted that Professor David J. Scheffer, a major contributor to the drafting of the Rome Treaty, has argued persuasively for the ICC’s constitutionality. Further, the Clinton administration signed on to the Rome Statute with Department of Justice advice that U.S. signing and eventual ratification were permissible under the U.S. Constitution.
The debate concluded with a lively question-and-answer session, in which the participants fielded incisive questions and further developed and responded to arguments. Professor Kontorovich conceded that the ICC is not an insidious institution that is causing great harm to U.S. interests even though he disputes its effectiveness. Professor Krohnke emphasized the progressive development of this young but growing institution, especially the expected conclusion this summer of the first trial of Thomas Lubanga of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, Dean Wippman stated that the disparate impact of the ICC across states and conflicts behooves supporters and critics alike to recognize its potentially variable effects around the globe.
Mahesha Subbaraman, the President of the local student chapter of the Federalist Society, moderated the debate but did not declare a winner. Nor was there any vote taken of the more than seventy-five students and faculty in attendance to determine who "won" the debate. The debate highlighted many issues surrounding the ICC and helped to raise awareness of this developing institution.
*Cross-posted from The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court (http://amicc.blogspot.com/2011/03/amicc-representative-in-minnesota.html)
Friday, May 6, 2011
Osama: The Photo and the Burial
There is no substantial reason for releasing the photo of a dead Osama Bin Laden. The only purpose it could serve is to add sensational grist to the mill of 24 hour news. Releasing the picture will only reinforce the idea that any trifling conspiracy theory is valid until proven otherwise; whether that be where Barack Obama was born or if OBL is truly dead. If the White House were lying about tracking and killing the world's most wanted terrorist, couldn't aforementioned terrorist burst the president's bubble by releasing another of his videos? And if this was a hoax, wouldn't the prankster be better served releasing the photo right before election day?
Withholding the picture is also important for the same reason OBL was buried at sea. He was more important to the global jihadist movement as an icon than an operator. Burial at sea prevents his final resting place from becoming a monument. The remains of Adolf Eichman, the architect of the Holocaust, were similarly scattered in the Mediterranean. Bin Laden's ideology hinges on aggrandizing his conflict to that of a holy war so that his followers believe that terrorism is a matter greater than deposing dictators or forcing Western powers to retract. Al-Qaeda seeks to build up its combatants as folk heroes, 9/11 organizer Khalid Sheik Mohahmed told a courtroom that he is like George Washington. Responding in kind would be confirming their self-proclaimed elevated status as an existential threat and would also be detrimental to the United States's safety. Terrorists should not be presented as madmen bent on razing the U.S., but as criminals, murderers, hypocrites who would just as soon kill the people the claim to be fighting for. Terrorists should not be given a forum for dramatic speeches, their burials should not be an occasion for ceremony. Combating terrorism is as much a conflict of ideas and the U.S. should not feed the discourse, but tamp down the grand language terrorism thrives on.
Withholding the picture is also important for the same reason OBL was buried at sea. He was more important to the global jihadist movement as an icon than an operator. Burial at sea prevents his final resting place from becoming a monument. The remains of Adolf Eichman, the architect of the Holocaust, were similarly scattered in the Mediterranean. Bin Laden's ideology hinges on aggrandizing his conflict to that of a holy war so that his followers believe that terrorism is a matter greater than deposing dictators or forcing Western powers to retract. Al-Qaeda seeks to build up its combatants as folk heroes, 9/11 organizer Khalid Sheik Mohahmed told a courtroom that he is like George Washington. Responding in kind would be confirming their self-proclaimed elevated status as an existential threat and would also be detrimental to the United States's safety. Terrorists should not be presented as madmen bent on razing the U.S., but as criminals, murderers, hypocrites who would just as soon kill the people the claim to be fighting for. Terrorists should not be given a forum for dramatic speeches, their burials should not be an occasion for ceremony. Combating terrorism is as much a conflict of ideas and the U.S. should not feed the discourse, but tamp down the grand language terrorism thrives on.
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
The Bin Laden Family
With Osama Bin Laden dominating the news and projections of what the future holds, I thought I would share something that I found absolutely fascinating when I first heard it a few years ago. Steve Coll spoke at the London School of Economics in support of his book The Bin Ladens. The book examines modernization and globalization in Saudi Arabia through the perspective of the Bin Laden family. Coll looks at the incredible story of Osama's father Mohamed who started out as an one-eyed illiterate who made bricks out of clay and grew into the head of the second wealthiest family on the peninsula after becoming the al-Saud royal family's favorite palace builder. Osama's oldest brother Salem lived an incredible life, but even more so when juxtaposed with what Osama. He had been an aviation enthusiast, rock and roll aficionado, and international bon vivant. He often liked to bribe bands to let him sing "House of the Rising Sun," whether it be at Oktoberfest, wedding receptions, or Oscar parties.
MP3
LSE Page
UPDATE:
This picture was in the Daily Telegraph and I think it highlights the dissonance of Osama Bin Laden's public persona juxtaposed with that of the normal arc of a person's life. This is during a family trip in Falun, Sweden. He is second from the right with the green shirt and blue bell bottoms.
MP3
LSE Page
UPDATE:
This picture was in the Daily Telegraph and I think it highlights the dissonance of Osama Bin Laden's public persona juxtaposed with that of the normal arc of a person's life. This is during a family trip in Falun, Sweden. He is second from the right with the green shirt and blue bell bottoms.
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Osama Bin Laden: The Militant, The Myth
Osama Bin Laden’s death was a stunning development for people around the world. We are faced with many questions about what comes next. Is the world a safer place? Yes. Nevertheless, will soldiers in Afghanistan stop worrying about improvised explosive devices? Will airport security no longer require passengers to remove their shoes? Can the U.S. pull troops out of Afghanistan tomorrow? Is the War on Terror over? No, unfortunately. The clearest take-away from Bin Laden's death is some measure of solace for the victims of 9/11, the men and women of the armed services, and their families.
The emotional celebrations in front of the White House are understandably an important part of a national catharsis. However, the media's eagerness to capitalize on the charged national mood by offering a tidy summary is misleading. Although Bin Laden's death is undoubtedly a landmark in the War on Terror, it by no means represents crossing a finish line. We do not yet know how involved Bin Laden was in the training, financing, and planning of Al-Qaeda's operations in recent years. If he had become disconnected from the core leadership while on the lam, then his death may not cause a serious operational disruption to the group. The symbolic significance is undeniable, but on its own, still may not be sufficient to cause the collapse of the organization. Audrey Kurth Cronin, author of "How Terrorism Ends," argues that "decapitation" is usually not enough independent of other factors. The recent democratic uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa have done a great deal to de-legitimize Al-Qaeda's founding premise that only asymmetrical holy war can bring about change. Couple that shifting landscape with the dramatic increase in drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Bin Laden's death may be enough to end Al-Qaeda as we know it.
9/11 was the most spectacular and traumatizing terrorist attack this generation has ever seen. After the attacks on New York and Washington, Bin Laden's legend grew to iconic status as the head of a terrorist organization with global reach and an agenda to take down the world's only super power. Before that terrible day, Bin Laden had been on par with the likes of Joseph Kony, the MRTA, Muammar Gaddafi, Idi Amin; murderous oddities on the fringe of American consciousness. Then entire world then knew the name Osama Bin Laden, a mass murderer and ideologue who delusionally strove for a transcontinental religious empire. For jihadist wannabes, he became an oversimplified brand whose subtext was deliverance from injustice, disrespect, and the ruin brought about by modernity. Other extremists took his mantle and started their own Al-Qaeda franchises in Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and even China. Terrorist groups similar to Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda will not stop targeting Americans. Extreme ideologies without the capability to confront a juggernaut like the U.S. military will always rely on ambushes, hiding amongst civilians, prying opportunities in open, cosmopolitan societies. As Bin Laden became more notorious, his role in directing attacks diminished, but the spread of his ideas is what made him most dangerous.
The death of Osama Bin Laden is certainly worth celebrating and while watching the revelry outside the White House I was struck by how young some of the people were. Some must have been children in 2001. It dawned on me that we too had bought into an oversimplified, grandiose idea of who Bin Laden was and what he stood for. As if all these extremist militants under his mantle would quietly go away, as if in an action movie. After 9/11, sympathy and support poured in from around the world and it was squandered in a wasteful war that had nothing to do with the attacks on two cities most emblematic of the United States. While rousing support for the War on Terror the United States became shamefully at ease with the blanket suspicion of Muslims. Islam was portrayed as a hateful monolith. There was no distinction made between secular dictators, militant groups with local agendas, and those touting a global holy war. Americans were told that breaking a tradition of anti-torture that was as old as their country was beyond question. Patriotism was said to trump the trampling of civil liberties. The United States had killed its boogieman, but terrorism did not start with Bin Laden and it will not end with his death. Justice has indeed been done, but the ideals that make the United States so great have been stained.
1: "Year of the Drone" New America Foundation
The emotional celebrations in front of the White House are understandably an important part of a national catharsis. However, the media's eagerness to capitalize on the charged national mood by offering a tidy summary is misleading. Although Bin Laden's death is undoubtedly a landmark in the War on Terror, it by no means represents crossing a finish line. We do not yet know how involved Bin Laden was in the training, financing, and planning of Al-Qaeda's operations in recent years. If he had become disconnected from the core leadership while on the lam, then his death may not cause a serious operational disruption to the group. The symbolic significance is undeniable, but on its own, still may not be sufficient to cause the collapse of the organization. Audrey Kurth Cronin, author of "How Terrorism Ends," argues that "decapitation" is usually not enough independent of other factors. The recent democratic uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa have done a great deal to de-legitimize Al-Qaeda's founding premise that only asymmetrical holy war can bring about change. Couple that shifting landscape with the dramatic increase in drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Bin Laden's death may be enough to end Al-Qaeda as we know it.
9/11 was the most spectacular and traumatizing terrorist attack this generation has ever seen. After the attacks on New York and Washington, Bin Laden's legend grew to iconic status as the head of a terrorist organization with global reach and an agenda to take down the world's only super power. Before that terrible day, Bin Laden had been on par with the likes of Joseph Kony, the MRTA, Muammar Gaddafi, Idi Amin; murderous oddities on the fringe of American consciousness. Then entire world then knew the name Osama Bin Laden, a mass murderer and ideologue who delusionally strove for a transcontinental religious empire. For jihadist wannabes, he became an oversimplified brand whose subtext was deliverance from injustice, disrespect, and the ruin brought about by modernity. Other extremists took his mantle and started their own Al-Qaeda franchises in Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and even China. Terrorist groups similar to Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda will not stop targeting Americans. Extreme ideologies without the capability to confront a juggernaut like the U.S. military will always rely on ambushes, hiding amongst civilians, prying opportunities in open, cosmopolitan societies. As Bin Laden became more notorious, his role in directing attacks diminished, but the spread of his ideas is what made him most dangerous.
The death of Osama Bin Laden is certainly worth celebrating and while watching the revelry outside the White House I was struck by how young some of the people were. Some must have been children in 2001. It dawned on me that we too had bought into an oversimplified, grandiose idea of who Bin Laden was and what he stood for. As if all these extremist militants under his mantle would quietly go away, as if in an action movie. After 9/11, sympathy and support poured in from around the world and it was squandered in a wasteful war that had nothing to do with the attacks on two cities most emblematic of the United States. While rousing support for the War on Terror the United States became shamefully at ease with the blanket suspicion of Muslims. Islam was portrayed as a hateful monolith. There was no distinction made between secular dictators, militant groups with local agendas, and those touting a global holy war. Americans were told that breaking a tradition of anti-torture that was as old as their country was beyond question. Patriotism was said to trump the trampling of civil liberties. The United States had killed its boogieman, but terrorism did not start with Bin Laden and it will not end with his death. Justice has indeed been done, but the ideals that make the United States so great have been stained.
1: "Year of the Drone" New America Foundation
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)