Obama Effect in Egypt

There are many parallels between Egypt and the U.S. during Obama's campaign and presidency. In both countries there was widespread unhappiness, primarily regarding the economy. The president was swept out of office by thousands, if not millions, of people who had never been involved in politics before. Following was a sense of euphoria at the ouster of the old regime, but so were elevated expectations for quick solutions to a variety of problems.

Unfortunately for the people of Egypt, the economy, culture of corruption, and absence of human rights will not be ameliorated overnight. Much like Obama's supporters who are relatively new to politics, those that participating in the January 25th protests will find that politics are a grind and solutions will necessitate compromise. It's hard to say how much of the energy of the protests will dissipate over time, especially if the 30 year old state of emergency persists and no substantial constitutional reforms are made.

The protesters have in their favor an incredible capacity to organize and motivate. It seems as though the demonstrators will persevere to dismantle the kabuki democracy that Mubarak had in place. It will be interesting to see what role Mohamed ElBaradei and Wael Ghonim will have in the future.

What Happens if Mubarak Steps Down?

Rumors are circulating today that Hosni Mubarak will step down tonight. The army chief of staff spoke to the crowd in Tahrir Square and said, "All your demands will be met." In addition, the military council met without Mubarak, who normally is the chair of the council. As I am writing, it is impossible to know if Mubarak will truly step down, or if this will be another weak attempt to placate the protesters. Whether it is now or in September, post-Mubarak Egypt will have several groups in play to shape the new government. It seems unlikely that the military or the old hands from Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) will be able to keep the current system in place and simply replace Mubarak at the top. Overwhelming demand for broader, democratic changes will most likely win out in the end. The challenge will be determining who will step forward to represent the diverse factions in Tahrir Square.

The ouster of Mubarak is not the only goal of the protests. They demand the dismantling of his dictatorial system in order to prevent another autocrat from taking over. Egypt's emergency law allows for security forces to arrest and torture with impunity. Also, the constitution allows the president to appoint half the upper house of parliament. One of the most important steps toward a democratic future would be to lift bans on political parties. Punishing corruption in the legal avenues and guaranteeing elections that can operate without coercion from the security forces are also big, but necessary steps toward real reform.

The wild card in this situation is the role of the military. Initially seen as non-partisan force allowing open expression by protesters, public perception changed last week when air force fighter jets buzzed Tahrir Square and the army personnel stationed around the square stood by as pro-Mubarak thugs/plain clothes police officers attacked civilians. In addition, Human Rights Watch reports that they have documented over one hundred arrests of protesters and many cases of arbitrary torture, often right near Tahrir Square. However, the army also eventually began to arrest pro-Mubarak troublemakers. As Egypt approaches the precipice of change, the army has made vague statements about preventing the country from sliding into chaos, and acknowledging that the people's will must be recognized. Mubarak and his newly minted vice president Omar Suleiman (head of intelligence) have also warned that if protesters are unwilling to make some compromises, the military will take power in a "coup."

Nevertheless, today the military's promise and Mubarak's anticipated departure have raised expectations to a level that will only be satisfied with a significant step forward. Friday promises to be the biggest day of protests yet (gathering after Friday prayers is generally when the biggest protests occur across the broader Middle East). Having Mubarak step aside and hand the reigns to Suleiman will not be enough to quell the protests. Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal has already left Egypt and it seems unlikely that someone as closely identified with the regime as Omar Suleiman would be an acceptable replacement. As a veteran of the '62 war in Yemen as well as the '67 and '73 wars with Israel, Suleiman is believed to have significant support within the higher ups of the military. Also, he has never been a member of the ruling NDP, but that fun fact will do little to counter Suleiman's image as an NDP man.

The biggest deficit in the uprising is perhaps also its most important strength. The protesters are representative of a wide range of Egyptian life, including age, gender, occupation, and class. It is unlikely that the entire government will be scrapped, but no single faction would be capable of faithfully representing the vast and divergent set of interests held by the whole group. Right now the most visible individuals among the protesters have been Mohamed ElBaradei, Wael Ghonim, and a few members of the Muslim Brotherhood that had unproductive meetings with Suleiman earlier in the week. It remains to be seen if the uniting power of rebellion against an authoritarian leader can be translated into a functioning government where fair compromises between groups can be struck. As Mubarak's presidency seems to be coming to its end, all eyes will be on Egypt as they work out these complex issues on the path toward representative democracy.

Egypt: The Tipping Point

Egypt's recent massive protests seem to be comprised of young men frustrated by joblessness. Historically, the combination of high unemployment and a heavy handed government leads to uprising almost without fail. The remaining question is whether the government has the ability to suppress the dissent.

Egypt is the world's most populous Arab nation and the average age is astonishingly low at 25. The stagnant economy has left many educated young people underemployed, if able to find work at all. Corruption has permeated the smallest aspects of life, ensuring that the languishing underemployed suffer the indignity of watching others get what they do not deserve. Aside from the intelligentsia, close to a fifth of Egypt's population lives below the poverty line, meaning they bring in less than $2 a day. While the graft and stunted economy have produced a general malaise, a few years ago a rockslide killed dozens of people in a slum outside Cairo. That tragedy roused anger at the shoddy construction and negligence of the government. The pervasive, underlying frustration with lack of job opportunities, and speculation about a Mubarak-less Egypt as he progresses in age, were tinder. The ouster of Tunisia's autocrat proved to be the light that has sparked the protests.

What happens next depends on the military. In the past, the police force has been more than willing to brutalize any dissenters, while garnering a reputation for skimming some of the informal economy to supplement their wages. As it currently stands, the police seem incapable of keeping a lid on the protests. The initial tactic of the riot police was to confront protesters with bamboo batons. When it was clear that the protesters outnumbered the police, the police turned to water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets; even this was not enough to quell the unrest. So far, the military has not gotten involved. Mubarak served in the Egyptian Air Force his entire career until President Anwar Sadat appointed him Vice President. He assumed the office of the presidency after Anwar Sadat's assassination. Eager to hold onto his role as president, he adopted a policy of shepherding officers from domestic affairs, establishing a patronage system that gives officers lucrative cuts of corporate profits under the military's purview, and forcing military officers to retire when their stature grew to a level of a viable candidate for the presidency. The significance of this is that there are angry, unemployed young people and angry, unemployed older military officers. The collaboration between the two would certainly precipitate Mubarak's exit.

Right now, the military could enter the situation in several capacities. Although unlikely, an officer (or cadre thereof) could enter the fray with political ambitions. There is historical precedence for this; Egypt has only had four presidents since the expulsion of the monarchy in 1952, but all of them have been former military men. The next option is that the military refuses to fight the protesters, similarly to Tunisian forces. The last possibility is that the military puts down the revolt similarly to what happened in Iran in 2009. The Egyptian military appears to include many disgruntled officers and grunts that more closely identify with the protesters than with the ruling elite. The military has a strong nationalistic bent. Because the protests do not seem to have a visible presence from the Muslim Brotherhood, a traditional enemy, this outcome seems unlikely.

A Standoff

Before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon finalized its initial indictments for the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, Hezbollah demanded that Rafik's son and current prime minister, Saad Hariri, disavow the tribunal. Leaks had indicated that the tribunal was going to drop the hammer on several Hezbollah members. Saad Hariri refused to comply, and Hezbollah's political coalition withdrew their ministers from the cabinet, effectively shutting down the government. Turkish - Qatari efforts at mediation failed, as did the previous Saudi - Syrian attempt. As the situation stands, tensions are mounting as an office of the Christian political party affiliated with Hezbollah was recently targeted for a grenade attack. Hezbollah deployed bands of unarmed men around Beirut. Although they did not appear to do anything besides loitering and chatting on walkie-talkies, it was enough to cause schools to shut down. Hariri made a defiant speech declaring that justice for his family and Lebanon will not be sold out because of the opposition's threats of violence.

As it now stands, there is one man who can tip the balance: Walid Jumblatt. His Druze voting bloc can give either coalition a majority and the right to appoint the new prime minister. After the 2008 skirmishes between Hezbollah and Jumblatt's fighters, Jumblatt threw his support behind the Hezbollah - Syria coalition. But now, Jumblatt seems to be at a crossroads. Syria assassinated his father decades ago. After a car bomb killed Rafik Hariri along with 22 others, Jumblatt was one of the most visible critics of Syria. Recently, he said that there could be "catastrophic consequences" if he sides with Hariri. As the head of a small community in proximity to a superior military force, he has a responsibility for the safety of his people, but at a potentially steep political cost. Jumblatt has said publicly that he will support the Hezbollah-Syrian candidate for prime minister, but he said he could only convince four or five of his bloc's 11 MPs to side with the opposition. Is this a clever maneuver to passive-aggressively cow to Hezbollah and Syria's requests while keeping his personal preference for prime minister in place? Or is Jumblatt's bloc, The Democratic Gathering, really so divided that individual MPs would defy the head of the party and stick their necks out? Or is Jumblatt splitting his MPs so that neither side has a majority and the new prime minister must be negotiated?

We will find out on Monday when the parliament meets with the president to decide who will be prime minister. In the meantime, the Lebanese army is establishing checkpoints and taking defensive positions around government buildings. Grocery stores and pharmacies are seeing people rush to stockpile essentials. Hopefully all this preparation will have been for nought.

Hezbollah, a Primer

Hezbollah has a role in Lebanese politics that is difficult to compare to any other organization in the world. They are at once a political party, hospital administrators, a micro-loan lender, a cable news network, and (at least in the eyes of the West) a terrorist organization. Hezbollah's permanence is fortified by the thousands that depend on them for social services, and by their function as the country's sole military power. The Party of God (Hezbollah's name translated to English) derives a great deal of their popularity from the fact that they are the sole armed group, including the Lebanese army, capable of standing up to Israel's military. "Resistance" has become synonymous with Hezbollah in Lebanese politics, and the party has always fought disarmament of its militia, even going as far as getting the cabinet to declare the militia's role as essential to national security. Hezbollah operates within the legitimate political structure until frustration sets in and they then utilize violence against their countrymen to get what they want.

Hezbollah's main pillars of support are Lebanon's Shia population and the Iranian government. Shia account for roughly a third of Lebanon's population and have historically been grossly under-served by the government. Around 2005, the typical Shi'ite made one fifth of the national average income. Thanks to Iran's significant financial contribution (estimated at $100 million yearly), Hezbollah is able to play Robin Hood and fill the void left by a negligent government. The party's popularity received major boosts in 2000, when Hezbollah attacks precipitated Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and in 2006, when Hezbollah fought the Israeli military to a draw. Israel is perceived by most Lebanese as the country's main enemy regardless of sect. During the 2006 war, opinion polls showed strong support for Hezbollah's militant fighting from Christians, Druze, and Sunnis. Although Hezbollah's secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, conceded that provoking Israel was a mistake, resisting the Israeli military's attempt to land a knockout blow bolstered their claim to be the people's champion throughout the wider Middle East. It also galvanized their claims for both the necessity and the strength of their arms.

Lebanon has a confessional political structure that is set up to give proportionate representation to all of the 18 recognized religious groups based on a census completed in 1932. While the confessional system was clearly imperfect at its inception in the 1940s, the growing Shia population soon out-stripped the governmental power allotted to them based on the 1932 census. Conducting a new census has very little traction because of the fears that it could reignite sectarian conflict. There is a perception that a new census would show that the Christian population has declined and the confessional system would have to be adjusted to decrease their representation. Part of the peace agreement that ended the civil war (1975-1990) was an alteration of the constitution to allow Christians and Muslims the same number of parliamentary seats (in contrast to the existing 6:5 ratio that favored Christians). Perhaps the biggest change has been the allowance for a parliamentary minority to have a veto. The veto was part of the 2008 Doha Accord, which ended gunfights in Beirut after the government shut down Hezbollah's private communications network and fired the head of airport security (a member of the party). Dahiyya, a southern suburb of Beirut, is a Hezbollah stronghold situated just north of the airport. When the head of airport security was fired, Hezbollah blockaded the roads leading to the airport. Another particularly unsettling part of the airport affair was the government's discovery of a Hezbollah surveillance camera system set up to monitor arrivals and departures. Ultimately, Hezbollah laid siege to buildings affiliated with the majority parties. At this time, there were also gunfights between Druze loyal to Walid Jumblatt and Hezbollah. After the fighting stopped, Jumblatt's parliamentary bloc switched its allegiance to the Hezbollah-Syria bloc that he had previously vociferously opposed. Perhaps most tellingly, last fall, Hezbollah indulged in a domestic military exercise simulating a coup d'état.

As it stands, Hezbollah has a veto allowing them to shut down the government at will, popular support, a military strength capable of standing up to Israel, the backing of Syria and Iran, and a tireless willingness to extort their countrymen.