Hezbollah's main pillars of support are Lebanon's Shia population and the Iranian government. Shia account for roughly a third of Lebanon's population and have historically been grossly under-served by the government. Around 2005, the typical Shi'ite made one fifth of the national average income. Thanks to Iran's significant financial contribution (estimated at $100 million yearly), Hezbollah is able to play Robin Hood and fill the void left by a negligent government. The party's popularity received major boosts in 2000, when Hezbollah attacks precipitated Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and in 2006, when Hezbollah fought the Israeli military to a draw. Israel is perceived by most Lebanese as the country's main enemy regardless of sect. During the 2006 war, opinion polls showed strong support for Hezbollah's militant fighting from Christians, Druze, and Sunnis. Although Hezbollah's secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, conceded that provoking Israel was a mistake, resisting the Israeli military's attempt to land a knockout blow bolstered their claim to be the people's champion throughout the wider Middle East. It also galvanized their claims for both the necessity and the strength of their arms.
Lebanon has a confessional political structure that is set up to give proportionate representation to all of the 18 recognized religious groups based on a census completed in 1932. While the confessional system was clearly imperfect at its inception in the 1940s, the growing Shia population soon out-stripped the governmental power allotted to them based on the 1932 census. Conducting a new census has very little traction because of the fears that it could reignite sectarian conflict. There is a perception that a new census would show that the Christian population has declined and the confessional system would have to be adjusted to decrease their representation. Part of the peace agreement that ended the civil war (1975-1990) was an alteration of the constitution to allow Christians and Muslims the same number of parliamentary seats (in contrast to the existing 6:5 ratio that favored Christians). Perhaps the biggest change has been the allowance for a parliamentary minority to have a veto. The veto was part of the 2008 Doha Accord, which ended gunfights in Beirut after the government shut down Hezbollah's private communications network and fired the head of airport security (a member of the party). Dahiyya, a southern suburb of Beirut, is a Hezbollah stronghold situated just north of the airport. When the head of airport security was fired, Hezbollah blockaded the roads leading to the airport. Another particularly unsettling part of the airport affair was the government's discovery of a Hezbollah surveillance camera system set up to monitor arrivals and departures. Ultimately, Hezbollah laid siege to buildings affiliated with the majority parties. At this time, there were also gunfights between Druze loyal to Walid Jumblatt and Hezbollah. After the fighting stopped, Jumblatt's parliamentary bloc switched its allegiance to the Hezbollah-Syria bloc that he had previously vociferously opposed. Perhaps most tellingly, last fall, Hezbollah indulged in a domestic military exercise simulating a coup d'état.
As it stands, Hezbollah has a veto allowing them to shut down the government at will, popular support, a military strength capable of standing up to Israel, the backing of Syria and Iran, and a tireless willingness to extort their countrymen.
As it stands, Hezbollah has a veto allowing them to shut down the government at will, popular support, a military strength capable of standing up to Israel, the backing of Syria and Iran, and a tireless willingness to extort their countrymen.
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