There is no Military Solution for Syria

The violent repression of pro-democracy protesters in Syria presents a difficult challenge for President Obama and his policy makers that is unlike any other in the Arab Spring. Since Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on March 28th that there will be no military intervention in Syria on March 28th, the severity of the government crackdown against protesters has escalated significantly. The Syrian intelligence services, or mukhabarat, is reported to have shot soldiers who refused to fire on protesters, snipers have been clearing the streets, a journalist was sent to an Iranian detention center, civilians fleeing into Lebanon have been turned over to the Syrian military, corpses showing signs of torture have been left in public squares, a mass grave outside Daraa has been uncovered, and tanks have shelled cities.

Some criticize Obama for inconsistent standards for intervention, considering his decision to step in during the backlash against protesters in Libya. The truth is that the issues in Syria are very different and an intervention by the U.S. military would not lead to a quick and decisive result.

Syria is a country of 22 million people in an area similar in size to North Dakota. The Assad family has been in control of the government, military, and economy since Hafez al-Assad appointed himself president in 1970. Hafez, the current president's father, ousted President Nureddin al-Atassi and Ba'ath Party Secretary General Salah Jadid that he had recently helped install in 1963. After decades of tumultuous leadership, Hafez al-Assad consolidated power by stocking the military and ubiquitous secret police with family and members of his Alawite religious sect, a group which accounts for 10% of the population. With the security services as the backbone of his regime, the final piece of the puzzle was establishing a patronage system for wealthy Sunnis. This created a system were business interests were dependent on Hafez's favoritism. Aside from his cult of personality portraying him as an omniscient, infallible father figure, his indelible legacy is razing the city of Hama (See Hama Rules for more). Hafez's oldest son Basil had been groomed to succeed  as president until Basil died in a car crash in the early 90's. After Basil's death, Hafez recalled his middle son Bashar from London where he had been studying to be an eye doctor. When Bashar took over the presidency after his father died in 2000 he was widely touted as a reformer. His inaugural speech made a point of emphasizing reform language. As recently as the end of March, American officials were still referring to him as a reformer. It is fairly simple to trace the arc of his father's career to the current regime. Before Hafez took over as president, the regime ruling Syria was divided in two camps, those focused on social reform and those who sought safety with the iron fist of the military. When Bashar took over, he maintained the system his father had established by promoting siblings and cousins to positions of prestige in the military and business world. Bashar has taken steps to liberalize the economy, opening the Damascus Stock Exchange, permitting private banks, lowering interest rates, and cutting subsidies. While the economy has grown, the benefits are enjoyed most by those with connections to the ruling family. Bashar al-Assad's rule has been mainly focused on prolonging his own presidency.

When considering America's experiences in Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq and the Balkans, it is clear that the general rule of American humanitarian expedition is that the potential for American casualties needs to be low, there needs to be a clear definition of obligations, and most importantly, any kind of action must lead to stability in some way. Intervention in Libya will be the exception. The U.S.'s military might is not going to be an effective tool in supporting democratic movements in the Arab Spring. The recent protests have hinged on the domestic military's willingness to kill civilians on behalf of the ruling elite:

• The Tunisian revolution was allowed to run its own course as the military refused to shoot at protesters and the president fled. 
• The U.S. role in Egypt's revolution is more difficult to discern. Hosni Mubarak was cooperative with U.S. goals and the U.S. was willing to turn a blind eye to his dictatorship. When protests started, the administration dithered on outright support of the Tahrir Square protesters. 
• In Yemen, the Obama administration has not applied pressure on its erstwhile partner in the War on Terror, President Saleh, to allow democratic reforms. This probably has more to do with the fact that Yemen is a nightmare waiting to happen. The country has gone through two civil wars, the last one in 1994. The national government's control is non-existent outside the capital, there is a strong secessionist movement in the south, and tribal warlords. Yemen is widely regarded as the most heavily armed population in the world, its water supply is dwindling, and khat use is rampant. Oil reserves make up 75% of government revenues, account for 90% of exports, and will dry up within a decade. It has the same population of its neighbor Saudi Arabia and 25% of the land mass. The average age is 18. Yemen is also host to the most active Al-Qaeda franchise. These are all elements that do not bode well for the future.
• In Bahrain, home of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, Obama stopped at simply urging restraint in the vicious crackdown of protesters. 
• In the case of Syria, the U.S. just passed tougher sanctions targeting president Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle, the European Union agreed on similar sanctions. These are largely symbolic, sanctions are an artifact from a bygone era that now serve to hinder, but by no means will they uproot regimes. With Syrian - U.S. relations on the rocks for years, there are probably few economic relations that sanctions would actually affect. 

Gaddafi's regime is an easy target. The man is an international pariah, and it was clear that no one would lift a finger to help him if the U.S. and NATO dropped the hammer on him. Once a prominent Pan-Arabist he is widely hated amongst Arab League states, he asks European governments to humiliate themselves before allowing access to Libyan oil, he ordered the Lockerbie Bombing, and he is still blamed for disappearing the Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr. He has restyled himself as a Pan-Africanist and a few years ago he was anointed the "King of Kings" by a collection of African tribal kings. When the Libyan civil war started a delegation of heads of state and foreign ministers fronted by South African premier Jacob Zuma attempted to broker a peace deal that essentially said that the rebels would give up their arms and Gaddafi would think about maybe making some reforms. Gaddafi soured his inter-African relationships by treating his peers as junior partners.

Syria is a horse of a different color. The regime is a favorite client of Iran, receiving training, supplies, and weapons. The two countries also share a defense pact. While Syria's military may not be on par with that of the U.S., they have been very active in stifling American objectives in the region in a variety of ways: 

• actively supporting Hamas and Hezbollah attacks on Israel.
• funneling militants into Iraq to fight the American occupation.
• building a secret nuclear reactor in a rogue act that unsettled its neighbors in a region in which secretive nuclear facilities are a sensitive issue i.e. Israel's unacknowledged nuclear weapons, Iraq's alleged attempts to build a nuclear bomb, tensions regarding Iran's efforts to establish themselves as a nuclear force.
• controling the Lebanese government through bribes and extortion.

National Public Radio featured a story about inevitable change in Syria, but with the level of brutality used to quash protests, the Syrian rebellion seems more likely to follow the trajectory of Iran 2009, when protesters were murdered and tortured, and ultimately the movement was successfully suppressed. The root causes of the rebellion will be left to simmer. John McCain rightly said that Syrian protesters should not expect a military intervention. Although disheartening, it is better to be up front about what support the U.S. can offer rather than tepidly offer support and then hang rebels out to dry like Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War in 1991. There will not be a military solution to Syria, but what the U.S. could do is use its influence in the World Trade Organization to accept Syria, which has applied twice and been rejected both times. In exchange, President Assad would have to step down and agree to disassemble the familial controls over the government, economy, and security forces. This is highly unlikely considering that Syria relies heavily on the patronage of Iran and the acquiescence of Russia on the UN Security Council.

Most Syrians have only known the chaos of the pre-Assad rule and the tyrannous reign that has been going on in the 40 years since, and any proposed transition will be raise the specter of violence seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and recent attacks on women and religious minorities in Egypt. After 40 years of brutalizing political dissidents and snuffing out Islamists, there are plenty whose yearning for justice will not be satisfied by having Assad sidelined and may seek retribution.

Syria presents a tempting prize for intervention advocates. Syria is vital to myriad nations' security, energy, democratic, and economic plans. For interventionists, the ideal outcome would be unplugging Syria as Iran's link to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah. Also, the secret peace talks with Israel brokered by Turkey would be cemented after being broken off because of the 2009 Israeli conflict with Hamas. Thirdly, the long border with Iraq would remain quiet (Assad had quietly shut down the border to militants years ago). Syria produces modest quantities of oil and natural gas, but its location makes it a key hub for pipeline networks. Also, the economy is largely underdeveloped, but it had been making baby steps in becoming slightly more cosmopolitan. But none of this will be possible through violence. Forcibly removing the ruthless dictator and his inner circle would leave a greater void than was left in Iraq. There needs to be an orderly transition of power and that would require Assad to voluntarily hand over the reins. Unfortunately, if a country with strong diplomatic, economic, and security ties to Syria, like Turkey, cannot persuade the Assad regime to curb the violence, then the U.S. has few effective options and will be relegated to waiting in the wings.